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vs. 
CHARLES M. BOVA, 
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Argument Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final Decree of Divorce signed on 
September 17, 1996, by the Honorable Frank G. Noel, Judge of the 
Third District Court for Summit County, State of Utah, and entered 
of record on September 19, 1996. (R.1658) Plaintiff's motion for 
new trial dated January 19, 1996 (R. 1186-7) was denied by order 
dated January 29, 1997, and entered January 31, 1997. (R. 1859) 
Defendant's Notice of Appeal was filed February 27, 1997, (R. 1862) 
and Plaintiff's Notice of Cross Appeal was filed March 6, 1997 (R. 
2088) . There have been no prior appeals on the merits, although 
both parties filed appeals before Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial 
was ruled upon by the trial court. These appeals were dismissed by 
this Court as premature in Number 960657-CA.1 
Jurisdiction is based on Title 78-2a-3(2) (h) Utah Code, and on 
Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW WITH CITATIONS 
TO RECORD FOR PRESERVATION FOR ISSUES FOR APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in double 
assessing Husband for Sea Doo debt and household items, and for 
assessing Husband for IRA funds expended for the benefit of both 
parties? (R. 1233-34) 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing 
to consider the expense of capital gains taxes on the marital home 
and thereby assessing all of such taxes to Husband? (R. 1232) 
3 . Did the trial court abuse its discretion by ordering 
Husband to assume all responsibility for the home equity line of 
credit where $11,500.00 of such debt resulted from the trial 
court's excessive temporary support order? (R. 1236-7, 1239-40) 
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing 
to impute full time work income to Wife for purposes of computing 
child support and alimony? (R. 1239-40) 
5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering 
child support by imputing 100 percent of income at the maximum 
xThe parties filed premature notices of appeal on October 17, 
1996 (R. 1759) and October 29, 1996 (R. 1793) while Plaintiff's 
Motion for New Trial was still pending. This Court dismissed such 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction in Number 960657-CA on December 19, 
1996. The remittur was received by the trial court on January 29, 
1997, on which date it entered its order denying Plaintiff's Motion 
for New Trial. 
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table amount to Husband and zero to Wife where Husband's income did 
not meet the maximum amount and Wife had substantial income? 
(R. 1244-45) 
6. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in not 
awarding the tax dependency exemptions to Husband? (R. 1251) 
7. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding 
Wife attorney's fees where Wife was without need, Husband was 
without ability to pay and adequate findings were not entered? 
(R. 1249-51) ! 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
An award of alimony or child support by the trial court will 
not be disturbed so long as the trial court exercises its 
discretion within the standards set by this state's appellate 
courts. Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 79 (Utah App. 1991); Haumont v. 
Haumont, 793 P.2d 423 (Utah App. 1990); Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 
P.2d 877 (Utah App. 1995) . The trial court's valuation and 
distribution of marital property similarly will not be disturbed 
absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion. Munns v. Munns, 
790 P.2d 121 (Utah App. 1990) . 
One standard set by Utah appellate courts is that trial courts 
must adhere to the requirements of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52 
which states: "In all actions tried upon the facts without a 
jury[,] ... the court shall find the facts specially and state 
separately its conclusions of law thereon." This requirement 
allows a reviewing court to discern the trial court's reasoning 
process and follow its analysis as it equitably distributes the 
parties' assets. See Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P. 2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 
3 
1979) ("findings should be sufficiently detailed and include enough 
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusion on each factual issue was reached") . Furthermore, under 
Rule 52, divorce cases are the only category in which findings of 
fact and conclusions of law may not be waived. Utah R.Civ.P. 
52(c). Potter v. Potter, 845 P.2d 272, 273-4 (Utah App. 1993). 
While the trial court enjoys broad discretion in matters of 
divorce, such authority does not extend to an arbitrary and 
unreasonable power to disregard credible, uncontradicted evidence 
and make findings inconsistent therewith and issue an order based 
thereon. King v. King, 478 P.2d 492, 25 Utah 2d 163, 168 (1970) . 
The proceedings are in equity and the appellate court may review 
questions of both law and fact, the very purpose of which is to 
rectify errors where the evidence does not support the findings or 
where it clearly preponderates against them. id. / Utah Const. , Art. 
VIII, Sec. 9. Due to the advantaged position of the trial court in 
close proximity to the parties and the witnesses, in the practical 
application of this rule there is a presumption of correctness of 
the trial court's findings and judgment with the burden upon the 
appellant to show they are in error and the appellate court must be 
convinced that a manifest injustice has been done. State in 
Interest of K.K.H., Utah, 610 P.2d 849 (1980). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Title 3 0-3-5 Utah Code, as amended. See Exhibit A of 
addendum. 
Title 78-45-7 Utah Code, as amended. See Exhibit B of 
addendum. 
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26 U.S.C. § 1. See Exhibit C of addendum. 
26 U.S.C. § 1034. See Exhibit D of addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal of the trial court's Decree of Divorce, and 
particularly its orders concerning property distribution, debt and 
tax liability allocation, alimony, child support and attorney's 
fees. 
2. Course of the Proceedings. 
Plaintiff/Respondent (Wife) filed this action for divorce on 
August 3, 1994. (R. 1) The case was tried on October 24, 25 and 
26, 1995, by the Honorable Frank G. Noel. The trial court entered 
minute entries stating its decision on December 14, 1995 (R. 1144-
49) and May 14, 1996 (R.1360-4). Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and the Decree of Divorce were entered on September 19, 1996. 
(R. 1633-1670) Plaintiff's motion for new trial dated January 19, 
1996 (R. 1186-7) was denied by order entered January 31, 1997. (R. 
1859) Defendant then filed this appeal on February 27, 1997 (R. 
1862) and Plaintiff cross-appealed on March 6, 1997. (R. 2088) 
3. Disposition in the District Court. 
The trial court granted each party a divorce and entered 
orders concerning child support, alimony, debt and property 
allocation and attorney's fees in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Decree of Divorce. 
4. Statement of Relevant Facts. 
Plaintiff, hereinafter called "Wife", and Defendant, 
5 
hereinafter called "Husband", were married on June 28, 1980. (R. 
1634) They have two sons, Mikell Bova, born March 8, 1984, and 
Christopher Bova, born May 17, 1987. (R. 1635, 1882) 
During the course of the marriage Husband engaged in 
extramarital affairs which resulted in the breakup of the marriage 
relationship. (R. 1634) Each party was granted a divorce from the 
other based upon irreconcilable differences. (R. 1659) 
Wife is a registered nurse who at the time of trial was 
employed by Kipp and Christian as a nurse paralegal. (R. 1638) 
Husband has a medical degree with board certification in emergency 
medicine and sports medicine and at the time of trial worked as an 
independent contractor for the Spine Center in West Valley City. 
(R. 2262-2265) 
CUSTODY - VISITATION 
After a hotly contested custody battle, and following the 
trial testimony of Dr. Elizabeth Stewart who recommended full 
custody of the children be awarded to Wife, the parties entered 
into a stipulation wherein the parties were awarded joint legal 
custody with Wife to have physical custody and the exclusive right 
to make decisions regarding activities of the children, including, 
medical issues, schooling, social activities, and sports 
activities. (R. 2054-2060) 
Husband was awarded extensive visitation including, inter 
alia, the right to have the children after school commencing 
Wednesday on one alternating week until before school on the 
following Monday and to have the children commencing Thursday after 
6 
school until before school on the following Monday on the next 
alternating week. During the school vacation period Husband would 
receive the children at 1:00 p.m. on Wednesday or Thursday of the 
alternating week in lieu of the after school time. The parties 
agreed to the holiday and birthday schedule of Section 30-2-35, 
Utah Code Annotated, and Husband was also awarded four weeks of 
summer visitation. (R. id., 1636-1637, Finding of Fact number 5) 
As part of the custody/visitation stipulation it was "also 
agreed that, irrespective of the amount of time that the defendant 
has with the children during any given month, that child support 
will be calculated on the sole-custody support worksheet." (R. 
2056, 2060) 
CHILD SUPPORT - ALIMONY 
At the time of trial Husband was employed as an independent 
contractor at the Spine Center in West Valley City. (R. 2262-2265) 
Husband's 1994 Form 1099 reflected income of $123,869.50 before 
Husband's business expenses to be claimed on Schedule C.2 (Exh. P-
17, P18) The trial court found Husband's annual income to be 
$124,600.00 before and $115,000.00 after business expenses, 
breaking down to $9,583.00 per month after $800.00 business 
expenses per month, but before taxes. (R. 1147, 1638, 2286, 
Finding of Fact 6) For purposes of Husband's appeal, Husband 
accepts the trial court's finding of $9,583.00 before tax income.3 
2Defendant also earned an additional $1,174.44 during 1994 
working for the Park City Ski Port. (R. 2286, Exh. P-18) 
3Husband reserves the right to challenge both the Court's 
determination of his gross income and his monthly business expenses 
7 
Wife testified that after Mikell was about one year old, Wife 
returned to work part-time and worked about one day per week, that 
Husband agreed that Wife should just work part-time and did not 
insist that she work full-time. (R. 1890-93) Wife was working 
about two and one-half days per week when Christopher was born. 
She then took maternity leave for a year with Husband's consent. 
When Christopher was fourteen months old, Wife returned to work as 
a paralegal working two days per week about two to three hours each 
day, again with Husband's consent. (R. 1896-8) The parties then 
separated for two and one-half years and the children lived with 
Wife. During this time Wife worked approximately 20 to 25 hours 
per week as a paralegal with a flexible schedule. This lasted 
until Mikell was in kindergarten in 1991. Wife then reconciled 
with Husband in 1991 at which time the parties moved from New 
Mexico to Utah. (R. 1882, 1900-01) Husband agreed that Wife did 
not have to work if she did not want to due to Husband's income. 
(R. 1903) Wife went to work for Snow Christensen as a nurse 
paralegal in October, 1991 and worked 25 to 30 hour weeks on a 
flexible schedule to accommodate Wife's commitment to the children 
and because Wife was a "wimp about driving in the snow" from Park 
City. Husband agreed to the arrangement because neither party 
wanted the children in full-time day care. (R. 1907-8) Wife left 
Snow Christensen in August, 1994, the same time she filed for 
divorce. (R. 1908, 1922) At that time she was making $23.75 per 
hour. (R. 2464) 
in order to defend against Wife's cross appeal. 
8 
Wife went to work as a nurse paralegal at Richards, Brandt, 
Miller & Nelson in October, 1994, at $15.00 per hour. Wife was 
under the impression she could work flexible hours, but was 
terminated on December, 1994, by the firm for leaving work daily at 
3:30 p.m. to be home when her children returned home from school 
despite the firm's expectations that she work full days. (R. 1967-
1975) 
At the time of trial in October, 1995, Wife worked for Kipp 
and Christian at $18.50 per hour. Wife had flexible hours and 
could set her own schedule (R. 2212) As discussed in Point IV, the 
trial court found that due to past agreements of the parties 
regarding Wife's part-time work and needs of the children, Wife's 
income would be calculated based upon a 30 hour week at $18.50 per 
hour. Husband herein challenges the trial court's failure to 
impute Wife's income based on a 40 hour work week. 
The Court found that Husband's monthly expenses including 
child support and taxes, were $8,045.00 and that Wife's monthly 
expenses were $4,595.00.4 It found that Wife's net income was 
$1,800.00 per month after taxes based upon a 30 hour work week. 
Husband was ordered to pay Wife $1,400.00 per month in child 
support and $1,200.00 in alimony. (R. 1147-8, 1637-1640, Finding of 
Fact Number 9) 
Husband was ordered to pay the monthly home mortgage payment 
of $1,789.00 until the home was either refinanced by Wife or sold 
4Husband does not challenge the trial court's findings of the 
parties' reasonable expenses herein, but reserves the right to do 
so if necessary to defend against Wife's cross-appeal. 
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with Husband to receive a credit therefore against his child 
support and alimony obligations. Husband was further ordered to 
pay the Home Equity Line of Credit payments until the home was 
refinanced or sold. (R. 1642, Finding of Fact number 11) 
RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS AND REAL PROPERTY 
Assets of the marriage included Husband's retirement and 
brokerage accounts in the approximate amount of $277,994.34. (R. 
1645), Finding of Fact number 15) Each party was awarded one-half 
of the value of these accounts. The marital home, located in Park 
City, Utah and held exclusively in Husband's name, was by 
stipulation valued at $385,000.00 and had a first mortgage balance 
of $176,165.00 at time of trial. Wife was granted possession of 
the home pending sale or refinancing. (R. 1641-2, Finding of Fact 
number 11) 
At time of trial the home was also subject to a Home Equity 
Line of Credit in the approximate amount of $25,435.00. The trial 
court awarded the home equity after the first mortgage equally to 
the parties and ordered Husband to pay all of" the Home Equity Line 
of Credit out of his half of the equity. (R. 1641, Finding of Fact 
11) 
The trial court found that Husband should pay all of the Home 
Equity Line of Credit because the Sea Doos awarded to Husband were 
purchased at $12,500.00 therefrom, Husband had paid attorney's fees 
to Craig Peterson therefrom, and Husband had paid temporary support 
owed to Wife therefrom. (R. 1641, Finding of Fact number 11) 
10 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 
The trial court awarded Husband Sea Doos valued at $7,500.00 
at time of trial which were obtained through the Home Equity Line 
of Credit for $12,500.00 in August, 1994. The trial court further 
awarded Husband household items (furniture etc.) valued at 
$11,050.00, the 1992 Subaru SVX automobile valued at $2,825.00, the 
Zion's checking account with a balance of $250.00, and the Zion's 
Money Market account with a balance of $600.00 (all valued at time 
of trial). (R. 1644-5, Finding of Fact 14) 
The trial court also awarded Husband $75,000.00 in value of an 
IRA account which requires separate discussion and is one of the 
subjects of appeal herein. The trial court totalled Husband's 
value of personal property to be $89,725.00. (id.) 
The trial court awarded Wife household items valued at 
$14,636.00, the 1994 Subaru valued at $1,795.00, and the February, 
1995 IRA distribution of $1,200.00, with such amounts totalling to 
$17,631.00. After adjusting for $6,450.00 of the $75,000.00 IRA 
which went to Wife, the trial court then ordered that the net 
$29,597.00 difference in personal property values be paid to Wife 
out of Husband's share of the home equity (before considering the 
Home Equity Line of Credit) (id., R. 1643, Finding of Fact 13) 
IRA 
When the parties separated in August, 1994, Husband removed 
$57,018.26 from Husband's IRA account which valued approximately 
$75,000.00. Of that amount Husband used $18,480.00 to pay 
estimated federal tax and $4,480.00 to pay estimated state tax. (R. 
11 
2317-8, 2440, 2505, Exh. D-28) Subsequently, the Court authorized 
Husband to withdraw an additional $12,900.00 with one-half 
($6,450.00) to benefit each of the parties as follows: $6,000.00 to 
attorneys' fees ($3,000.00 to each party's attorney), $3,000.00 to 
Dr. Elizabeth Stewart for the custody evaluation and $3,900.00 for 
payment of family medical bills. At the time he removed the 
$12,900.00, Husband removed the remaining approximate $4,000.00 
from the IRA as well, thus closing out the IRA. (R. 1642, Finding 
of Fact number 12) 
The trial court ordered that Husband pay the ten percent 
penalty on all of the $75,000.00 except for $645.00 attributable to 
Wife's $6,450.00 benefit therefrom. The trial court found that 
approximately $18,000.00 would be owed in income taxes on the IRA 
funds and ordered the parties to share in payment of taxes with 
$18,000.00 of the anticipated proceeds of the home being applied to 
such taxes before the parties' one-half equity positions were 
determined, (id.) 
TAXES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 
The trial court also ordered the parties to file joint 1994 
income taxes and to equally share in the responsibility for taxes 
owed. (R. 1146, 1361-2, 1642-3) The court made no rulings 
regarding responsibility for capital gains taxes on the home. It 
ordered Husband to pay $15,000.00 of Wife's attorney's fees and 
that such amount be paid from Husband's one-half of the home 
equity. (R. 1643-4, Finding of Fact number 13) 
12 
SUBSEQUENT ORDER 
Husband failed to make the home payments and foreclosure 
proceedings commenced against the marital home. By order entered 
October 14, 1996, the trial court stated that Husband's equity was 
$104,417.50 and then re-defined charges upon Husband's equity in 
the home to include foreclosure costs and monthly mortgage 
arrearages, the Home Equity Line of Credit, Husband's attorneys' 
liens (Okasaki and Christian), Wife's attorney's lien of 
$15,000.00, and one-half of the State Tax Commission tax warrant. 
The order further provided that if the total of the foregoing 
encumbrances were in excess of Husband's equity, Husband would 
provide to First American Title certified funds to pay the balance 
in full. (R. 1778-9, 1109-10, 1307-8). 
A handwritten paragraph 8 of the order stated, "It appears to 
the Court that the amount Dr. Bova will owe is approx. $4,000, but 
that amount may vary depending on exact amount of liens."5 (R. 
1780) An effect of the order was to leave Wife's award of 
$29,597.00 intended to equalize the personal property no longer 
secured by Husband's equity. 
5Based upon Wife's affidavit (R.1730) it appears that 
anticipated foreclosure costs, including the arrearage, penalties 
and legal costs, were approximately $16,000.00, the Home Equity 
Line of Credit was approximately $3 0,424.40, the Okasaki and 
Christian attorneys' fees liens (Husband's) were $38,489.42 and 
$4,864.59, Wife's attorney's lien was $15,000 and one-half of the 
state tax lien was $2,627.50. These figures subtracted from 
$104,417.50 leave a negative balance of $2,988.41. 
13 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DOUBLE ASSESSING 
HUSBAND FOR SEA DOO DEBT AND HOUSEHOLD ITEMS, AND FOR 
ASSESSING HUSBAND FOR IRA FUNDS EXPENDED FOR THE BENEFIT 
OF BOTH PARTIES 
The trial court erred in assigning all $12,500.00 in Sea Doo 
debt where the value of the Sea Doos at trial was only $7,500.00. 
The trial court also erred in double counting household items worth 
$4,577.00 in determining the value of personal property awarded to 
Husband. The trial court further erred in assigning personal 
property value to Husband of proceeds of the IRA which prior to 
trial had been expended for family purposes such as attorneys' 
fees, custody evaluation, medical expenses and income taxes. These 
over-assessments total $43,513.00 and result in an over-award to 
Wife of $21,756.50. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO 
CONSIDER THE EXPENSE OF CAPITAL GAINS TAXES ON THE 
MARITAL HOME AND THEREBY ASSESSING ALL OF SUCH TAXES TO 
HUSBAND 
The marital home was owned exclusively in Husband's name. The 
trial court ordered the equity in the marital home split without 
considering the effect of the 28% capital gains tax on an 
anticipated gain of approximately $120,000.00. Such taxes of 
$33,600.00 will be wholly borne by Husband as a result of his 
exclusive ownership. The trial court abused its discretion in not 




THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ORDERING HUSBAND 
TO ASSUME ALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE HOME EQUITY LINE OF 
CREDIT WHERE $11,500,00 OF SUCH DEBT RESULTED FROM THE 
TRIAL COURT'S EXCESSIVE TEMPORARY SUPPORT ORDER 
Husband, ordered to pay temporary support in the amount of 
$3,134.00 monthly and to pay disability insurance in the amount of 
$318.00, had insufficient income to pay such amount and borrowed 
about $11,500.00 against a home equity line of credit. After trial 
Husband's combined child support and alimony was set at $2,600.00 
per month, a difference of $852.00 per month. This monthly 
difference, plus property taxes paid, exceeded the $11,500.00 
borrowed through the home equity line of credit while the case was 
pending trial. The trial court erred in ordering Husband to pay 
all $11,500.00 of the home equity line of credit and should have 
required Wife to pay one-half. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO 
IMPUTE FULL TIME WORK INCOME TO WIFE FOR PURPOSES OF 
COMPUTING CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY 
The trial court erred in failing to impute child support and 
alimony income to Wife based upon a 40 hour work week since Wife's 
history of working part-time was a result of adequate incomes for 
one household and since Wife has a flexible work schedule and no 
responsibility for the children during at least ten weekdays per 
month. The trial court erred in not considering these factors when 
it imputed Wife's income on the basis of a 30 hour work week. 
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POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING CHILD 
SUPPORT BY IMPUTING 100 PERCENT OF INCOME AT THE MAXIMUM 
TABLE AMOUNT TO HUSBAND AND ZERO TO WIFE WHERE HUSBAND'S 
INCOME DID NOT MEET THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT AND WIFE HAD 
SUBSTANTIAL INCOME 
The parties stipulated that child support would be figured 
"according to the schedule." However, Husband's gross income of 
$9,583.00 and Wife's gross income of $2,386.00 based upon a thirty 
hour work week totalled to more than $10,000.00, the maximum amount 
of the schedule. The trial court erred in setting Husband's child 
support at $1,400.00 per month, which figure assumes that Husband 
earned $10,000.00 per month and Wife earned zero. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT AWARDING THE 
TAX DEPENDENCY EXEMPTIONS TO HUSBAND 
The trial court erred in not awarding Husband the tax 
dependency exemptions where the court failed to make findings of 
fact, failed to consider Husband's high support obligation, failed 
to consider Husband's extensive visitation time, failed to consider 
Wife's ability to work a 40 hour week and failed to consider the 
inadequacy of Husband's property award. 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING WIFE 
ATTORNEYS FEES WHERE WIFE WAS WITHOUT NEED, HUSBAND WAS 
WITHOUT ABILITY TO PAY AND ADEQUATE FINDINGS WERE NOT 
ENTERED 
The trial court erred in awarding Wife $15,000.00 in 
attorney's fees where it failed to consider the gross 
disproportionality of the property settlement in favor of Wife, 
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Wife's lack of need for assistance with her fees, and Husband's 
lack of ability to pay fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DOUBLE ASSESSING 
HUSBAND FOR SEA D00 DEBT AND HOUSEHOLD ITEMS, AND FOR 
ASSESSING HUSBAND FOR IRA FUNDS EXPENDED FOR THE BENEFIT 
OF BOTH PARTIES 
The trial court properly attempted to equally split the 
marital property and debt. However, the court made numerous 
significant errors which must be corrected by this Court. 
Sea Doos debt. In Finding of Fact number 11, the trial court 
found that approximately $18,000.00 of the Home Equity Line of 
Credit was used by Husband for his own purposes to pay attorneys' 
fees6 and to purchase Sea Doo water crafts which were awarded to 
Husband in Finding of Fact number 14. Husband testified that the 
Sea Doos cost $12,500.00. (R. 1641, 1644-5) The trial court found 
that at the time of trial the Sea Doos were worth $7,500.00 and 
awarded them to Husband. (R. 1644-5, Finding of Fact number 14) In 
Finding of Fact 14 the trial court subtracted $7,500.00 from the 
value of personal property which it was awarding to Husband because 
it had ordered Husband to pay the debt associated with the Sea Doos 
in Finding of Fact 11. 
The trial court erred in not recognizing that it had ordered 
Husband to pay $12,500.00 worth of debt in Finding of Fact number 
11 while unequally "offsetting" it with only $7,500.00 worth of 
6This finding is challenged at Point III, supra. 
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property value in Finding of Fact number 14. Thus the trial court 
left Husband with $5,000.00 in debt not matched by receipt of an 
equivalent property value. Husband is, therefore, entitled to a 
credit of $2,500.00 and the trial court erred in not granting such 
credit. 
Household items awarded to Husband. In Finding of Fact 14 the 
trial court found that after deducting $7,500.00 for the value of 
the Sea Doos, Husband would receive $11,050.00 in household items. 
The trial court also found that Husband had received $75,000.00 in 
value of funds Husband removed from an IRA.7 
However, Husband testified that he used a portion of the IRA 
proceeds to purchase household items including the boy's bedroom 
($3,600.00), kitchen ($850.00), recreation room ($1,200.00), Hi-Fi 
($650.00), and dining room ($3,200.00) when he established his new 
household following the parties' separation. (R. 2313-4, 2375-
2377, 2505-6, Exh. D-28) Further Exhibit D-28 also showed that a 
computer and station costing $2,400.00 and $320.00 respectively 
were also purchased with IRA money. These items in turn appeared 
on the appraisal used by the trial court in determining the value 
of personal property awarded to the parties.8 (Exh. D-25) The 
total appraised value of these item came to $4,577.00. 
The appraisal valued the Sea Doos at $7,500.00 and all 
7The $75,000 figure itself is erroneous for reasons discussed, 
infra. 
8These appear as items 4, 6, 15, 18, 20, 21a, 23, 26, 27, 28, 
31, 32, 37, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47 of the appraisal on Exhibit D-
25. 
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property at Husband's home (including the Sea Doos) at $18,770.00 
after adjustments. (Exh. D-25) Therefore, the Court's valuing of 
Husband's personal property exclusive of the Sea Doos as 
$11,050.00, necessarily included the items purchased with the IRA 
funds. The Court erred in double counting the household item 
valued at $4,577.00 at time of trial. 
IRA value attributable to Husband. The trial court erred in 
crediting Husband with the full value of the $75,000.00 removed 
from the IRA. Early in the proceedings the trial court authorized 
Husband to remove $12,100.00 and pay $6,000.00 ($3,000.00 each) for 
the parties' attorneys' fees, $3,000.00 for Dr. Stewart's custody 
evaluation and $3,900.00 for family medical bills. (R. 1642, 
Finding of Fact 12) The trial court ordered that Husband pay all 
of the tax penalty associated with the $75,000.00 except the 
penalty associated with the $6,450.00 attributable to Wife's one-
half of the $12,900.00 removed with court permission. Husband does 
not challenge this specific ruling. However, it is clear that 
before income tax, Husband received only $62,900.00, not 
$75,000.00, since the $12,900.00 had previously been expended with 
Court permission to the benefit of both parties. 
The trial court found that taxes of $16,000.00 were owed on 
the IRA withdrawal exclusive of the penalty to be paid. It ordered 
Wife and Husband to bear the costs of income taxes equally by 
ordering that the $16,000.00 in taxes be paid from the proceeds of 
the home before proceeds were divided between the parties, {id.) 
Additionally, the trial court intended that each party bear one-
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half of all of the 1994 income taxes, except the IRA penalty. (R. 
1362) 
Husband's $62,900.00 share of the IRA is reduced by the 
$8,000.00 he must pay for taxes on the $75,000.00. Husband's share 
is enhanced to the extent that Wife pays taxes on the $75,000.00 in 
excess of the $6,450.00 she received as one-half of the $12,900.00 
withdrawn with court permission. Wife's $6,450.00 equals 8.6 
percent of the total $75,000.00. This 8.6 percent times $16,000.00 
total tax liability equals $1,376.00. Thus Husband benefits by 
Wife paying $8,000.00 in taxes on the $75,000.00 in the amount of 
$6,624.00. [$,8,000.00-$l,376.00] Husband's net receipt of 
property attributable to the IRA after taxes (exclusive of the 
penalty) therefore is $61,524.00 ($62,900.00-$l,376.00) . 
Accordingly, the Court erred in ignoring prior expenditures and tax 
consequences in valuing Husband's IRA value at $75,000.00 rather 
than $61,524.00. 
Further, Husband testified that he withdrew $57,018.26 from 
the IRA on August 18, 1994. He testified he used $18,480.00 of the 
IRA funds to pay partial estimated 1994 federal income tax, and 
$4,480.00 to pay partial estimated 1994 state income tax, such 
disbursements totalling $22,960.00.9 (R. 2317-8, 2440, 2505, Exh. 
D-28, Exh. P-23, p.10) Wife challenged Husband's wisdom in making 
the withdrawal (R. 2390-1, Exh. P-23), but not the fact that 
Husband had made the $22,960.00 in tax payments. Therefore, these 
9Husband also used $5, 600 to pay estimated penalty tax on the 
withdrawal. As previously noted, Husband was required to pay all 
of the penalty associated with this amount. 
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facts must also be taken into account in determining the amount of 
the IRA actually received by Husband. As the trial court ruled 
that $16,000.00 of taxes attributed to the IRA withdrawal would be 
paid from proceeds from the sale of the home and intended that each 
party pay one-half of the 1994 income taxes (R. 1362), Husband's 
estimated tax payments of $22,960.00 made in August, 1994 applied 
towards the parties' taxes from employment income and benefitted 
both parties. Exhibit D-19, the joint 1994 1040 tax return which 
Husband prepared, showed at line 55 that $44,640.00 of estimated 
taxes had been paid and at line 64 that $25,422.00 remained to be 
paid. This $25,422.00 amount corresponds with the $18,000.00 
income taxes and the $7,500.00 penalty the Court estimated to be 
owed on the IRA withdrawal. Therefore, the $22,960.00 expended by 
Husband for the common benefit of the parties was not available and 
was not received by Husband as his portion of the personal property 
settlement. The Court erred in including this $22,960 value in 
Plaintiff's personal property received. 
This case is controlled by Enrody v. Enrody, 914 P.2d 1166, 
1170-1 (Utah App. 1996), the wife argued that the trial court erred 
in failing to require the husband to account for property 
transferred while the divorce was pending. This Court upheld the 
trial court noting that $20,000.00 of cattle had been sold by 
Husband to pay for temporary support and that a home transferred 
into a trust had been accounted for by awarding the wife one-half 
of husband's ownership in the trust. Therefore, it was 
inappropriate to charge the husband for non-existent or duplicated 
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assets. 
To summarize, the $89,725.00 value assessed as Husband's 
personal property in Finding of Fact number 14, must be reduced as 
follows: 
$ 2,500.00 1/2 of $5,000.00 debt not shared 
by Wife (Sea Doos $12,500.00 
loan - $7,500.00 value at trial) 
$ 4,577.00 Double counted Household Items 
$12,100.00 Used to pay authorized 
expenses equally for both 
parties 
$ 1,376.00 Wife's portion of $16,000.00 
taxes ($8,000.00-$6,62 7.00) 
$22,960.00 Spent in 1994 to pay 1994 
income taxes 
Total adjustment: $43,513.00 
The trial court clearly erred in failing to make these 
adjustments and as a result improperly awarded Wife $21,756.00 
[$43,513.00/2]. The court's $29,597.00 figure must be reduced by 
$21,756.00 to $7,840.50 before further adjustment is made for 
capital gains tax liabilities considered in Point II. The case 
must be remanded with instructions to correct these errors. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO 
CONSIDER THE EXPENSE OF CAPITAL GAINS TAXES ON THE 
MARITAL HOME AND THEREBY ASSESSING ALL OF SUCH TAXES TO 
HUSBAND 
The trial court intended that the equity in the home be shared 
equally by the parties.10 (R. 1643-4), Finding of Fact Number 13) 
10Wife testified that Husband should receive one-half of the 
equity in the home, but with such one-half to be charged with her 
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Despite good intentions, the trial court abused its discretion in 
awarding Wife one-half of the equity without also requiring her to 
be responsible for one-half of the capital gains taxes attributable 
thereto. 
Title to the marital home was in Husband's name alone and 
Husband was solely liable on the first mortgage and the home equity 
line of credit.11 (R. 2497) The first mortgage balance as of 
October 1, 1995 was $176,165.00. (R. 2498) Pursuant to stipulated 
appraisal, the trial court found the value of the home at time of 
trial in October, 1995, to be $385,000.00. (R. 1641, Finding of 
Fact number 11) 
During the pendency of the action and afterwards under the 
Decree of Divorce, Wife was granted the exclusive possession of the 
home. Husband has not lived in the home since August, 1994. The 
trial court ordered that either the home be refinanced in Wife's 
name with Wife to have title, or that the home be sold with each 
party to receive one-half of the equity after costs of sale, 
payment of the first mortgage and payment of the 1994 income 
taxes.12 (R. 1641-3, Finding of Fact numbers 11, 13) Husband's one-
half of the home equity, in turn, was to be charged for payment of 
share of the IRA proceeds received by Husband. (R. 2179-80) 
l:LHusband testified that the home, mortgage and home equity 
line of credit were in his name alone due to Wife's poor credit 
history. (R. 2497-9) 
12As of the date of this brief the home had not been sold and 
Wife had not qualified to refinance the home. Given the passage of 
time to date without refinancing and Wife's poor credit history 
(R.2497-9) it is highly unlikely that Wife will refinance the home. 
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Wife's $29,597.00 balance due to equalize personal property 
distribution,13 $15,000.00 of Wife's attorney's fees, and all of the 
$7,500.00 IRA withdrawal penalty except only $645.00 attributable 
to the $6,450.00 benefit received by Wife of Husband's authorized 
$12,900.00 withdrawal.14 (R. 1643, Finding of Fact number 13) 
By not considering taxes, the trial court further dramatically 
lessened Husband's share of the property settlement. The home's 
basis is $265,000.00. Husband, as sole owner, will be 100 percent 
assessed by the IRS for capital gains taxes on the $120,000.00 gain 
if the property is sold. Husband thus stands to pay $33,600.00 in 
capital gains taxes incurred at the top rate of 2 8 percent given 
Husband's level of income. 26 U.S.C. § 1(h) The decree completely 
fails to allocate any responsibility for payment of such taxes to 
Wife. 
Further, Husband will not be eligible to roll over any portion 
of the gain into the purchase of a new principal residence within 
two years. Section 1034 of 26 U.S.C. authorizes the roll-over of 
up to $125,000.00 of gain into another principal residence acquired 
within two years provided the home sold was the seller's principal 
residence. Husband does not meet the "principal residence" 
condition since he hasn't lived in the home since 1994. Therefore, 
an immediate tax liability awaits Husband on the sale of the home. 
13As shown in Point I, the $29,597 figure is itself incorrect, 
and should be $7,840.50 before considering capital gains tax issues 
raised in Point II. 
14A year later this arrangement was adjusted to deal with liens 
filed by Husband's attorneys and other issues. (R. 1778-80) See 
discussion at pages 13-14, supra. 
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This case is completely different from the situation in Howell 
v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1213-4 (Utah App. 1991) where tax 
consequences were properly disregarded as speculative because tax 
liability might be avoided through use of the Section 1034 roll 
over.15 
The case must be remanded with the trial court ordered to 
consider the impact of taxes upon its allocations of marital assets 
and debts and to require the parties to equally bear the tax 
responsibility of sale of the home. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ORDERING HUSBAND 
TO ASSUME ALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE HOME EQUITY LINE OF 
CREDIT WHERE SUCH $11,500.00 OF SUCH DEBT RESULTED FROM 
THE TRIAL COURT'S EXCESSIVE TEMPORARY SUPPORT ORDER 
Husband purchased the Sea Doos for $12,500.00 in August or 
September, 1993 through a Home Equity Line of Credit (HELC) 
established pursuant to an loan application filed in April, 1993. 
(Exh. D-23, R. 2174-5, 2543). Wife testified that about the same 
time as Husband purchased the Sea Doos in 1993 Husband accessed the 
line of credit for an additional $3,000.00 (R. 2176, 2179) which he 
used to pay $3,200.00 in attorney's fees to attorney Craig 
Peterson.16 
15Also, in Howell the facts indicated that the home was owed 
by both parties thus leaving both parties with a stake in assuring 
that taxes were minimized. 806 P.2d at 1210 Here Wife, free of 
tax liability since she doesn't own the home, has no interest in 
assuring that Husband's taxes are minimized. 
16Wife did not produce line of credit records and her testimony 
was confusing in some regards. Further her testimony was subject 
to a continuing objection of lack of foundation and failure to meet 
the best evidence rule. Husband believes that this is an accurate 
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Husband testified that he had used the line of credit to 
purchase the Sea Doos for $12,500.00 and to pay $3,000.00 to Craig 
Peterson in approximately August, 1993. (R. 2543) Husband 
testified that between August, 1993 and August, 1994 when the 
parties separated, the loan balance was paid down to $14,000.00. 
(R. 2501, 2543-4) This testimony was uncontroverted. 
In July, 1995, Husband obtained leave of the Court to increase 
the line of credit to $20,000.00 to pay mortgage payments owed on 
the home. Approximately $3,815.00 was borrowed to pay home 
mortgage payments, $1,400.00 was borrowed to pay home property 
taxes, a condition of the loan, and an amount not recalled at trial 
went to loan fees. (R. 2501-2, 2542-3, 2557) 
In October, 1995, Husband again obtained leave to further 
increase the line of credit to cover approximately three months 
mortgage payments. (R. 2543) Husband testified that as of the date 
of trial the balance of the HELC was $25,435.00. (R. 2498) 
In its original minute entry following trial the trial court 
stated: 
The Court will allow the Home Equity Line of Credit 
to be used to pay Dr. Stewart, Family Affairs, and to 
bring the mortgage payments current to the date of this 
order. The Court will then allow the HELC to be deducted 
from the sale proceeds of the home before a division of 
the equity with the exception of $18,000. Approximately 
that amount was used by defendant for his own purposes 
such as attorneys fees, the Sea Doos for which he should 
be responsible, particularly in light of the fact that 
the court is awarding the full value of the Sea Doos to 
Defendant without being charged against him as marital 
property as set out below. (emphasis added) 
representation of Wife's testimony based upon Wife's closing 
arguments at R. 2576. 
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(R. 1146) 
The Court's use of the $18,000.00 figure with reference to 
Husband's payment of attorneys' fees is confusing and erroneous. 
The evidence was uncontroverted that the line of credit balance was 
$14,000.00 when the parties separated and that the Sea Doos were 
purchased for $12,500.00 and $3,000.00 had been paid to Craig 
Peterson as attorney's fees in August, 1993, a year before the 
parties' separation. Therefore, even if the Peterson attorney's 
fees were wholly assessed to Husband, the unpaid amount at the date 
of separation was only $1,500.00 ($14,000.00-$12,500.00=$1,500.00) 
and such amount was included within the $14,000.00 balance. 
The trial court did arrive at approximately an $18,000.00 
figure when, during Husband's testimony, it reviewed the figures 
before it and cited the $12,500.00 Sea Doo amount, approximately 
$4,000.00 ($3,815.00) in mortgage payments and $1,400.00 in 
property taxes. The Court noted that these amounts approximated 
$18,000.00, and that $7,000.00 represented the approximate balance 
of the line of credit to reach $25,435.00. (R. 2500-2) The Court 
correctly did not include the Peterson attorney's fees in its 
review of the evidence at that point. Presumably, the trial court 
confused the evidence when it issued its memorandum decision, but 
it erred in using the $18,000.00 figure rather than the $14,000.00 
figure as the base figure.17 
17Husband could appropriately challenge the remaining $1,500 
difference between $12,500 and $14,000 since the Peterson 
attorney's fees were paid a year before the parties separated. 
However, Husband waives any claim to the $1,500 for simplicity's 
sake, while reserving the right to raise the issue to contest 
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After the trial court's original minute entry, Wife argued 
that the balance of the HELC above $18,000.00 consisted of loans 
used by Husband to pay his temporary support obligation and, 
therefore, Husband must pay the entire balance of the HELC or Wife 
would in effect be paying one-half of Husband's temporary support 
obligation. (R. 1168-9) The trial court agreed with Wife and in 
its subsequent minute entry stated: 
... The court agrees with Plaintiff that this may 
have been error inasmuch as a substantial portion of that 
amount of the line of credit that exceeds $18,000.00 was 
incurred by the defendant to make mortgage payments and 
temporary alimony payments as ordered by the court. To 
allow those amount (sic) to be deducted from the sales 
proceeds of the home prior to the division of equity 
would have the effect of requiring the plaintiff to pay 
one half of the temporary alimony and support awarded to 
her. This, of course, would be unfair. ... Accordingly, 
the court will require the defendant to pay the entire 
balance of the home equity line of credit. (R. 1361) 
The trial court erred in requiring Husband to bear full 
responsibility for the line of credit above $14,000.00. First, it 
is uncontroverted that $1,400.00 of the line of credit went to pay 
property taxes on the home and benefitted both parties. The court 
erred in not requiring Wife to pay one-half ($700.00) of such 
amount. 
Second, the court erred in requiring Husband to assume the 
entire $10,035.00 difference between the $15,400.00 balance of the 
line of credit after payment of the taxes18 and the $25,435.00 
balance of the line of credit at time of trial. A spouse with 
Wife's cross appeal if necessary. 
18$14,000 + $1,4 00 = $15,400 
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income sufficient to pay his temporary support obligation perhaps 
should not be allowed to escape such obligation by reducing the 
value of a marital asset (i.e. home) by encumbering the asset with 
loans used to pay for such temporary support. However, a spouse 
who, prior to a full trial on the merits, is required to pay 
temporary support beyond his ability, in an amount which exceeds 
the amount of support ultimately determined following trial on the 
merits, must be credited back the value of his temporary support 
over-assessment. 
This situation is again governed by Enrody v. Enrody, 914 P. 2d 
1166, 1170-1 (Utah App. 1996). In Enrody, this Court upheld the 
trial court's failure to assess the husband for the value of 
$2 0,000.00 of cattle sold by Husband to pay for temporary support. 
The husband, due to age and health, was no longer employed as a 
highly paid pilot and did not have income sufficient to pay 
temporary support to wife. 
Herein, pursuant to stipulation on August 22, 1994, Husband 
was ordered to pay $1,345.00 temporary child support and to pay the 
mortgage payment in the amount of $1,789.00 per month as temporary 
alimony making a total temporary support obligation of $3,134.00. 
(R. 123, 131-2) After trial on the merits in October, 1995, the 
court determined that Husband was able to pay only $1,400.00 in 
child support and $1,200.00 in alimony, making a total monthly 
obligation of $2,600.00, an amount $534.00 per month less than the 
amount of temporary support ordered. (R. 1147-1148) Additionally, 
during the temporary support time period Husband was also ordered 
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to maintain disability insurance at the rate of $318.00 per month, 
an obligation not required in the final decree. (R. 70, 137, 1640-
1) Fifteen months (August, 1994 to October, 1995) of over-
assessment of $852.00 ($534.00+$318.00) comes to $12,780.00. Two 
additional months of paying temporary support and disability 
insurance between trial date and the court's initial minute entry 
ruling of December 14, 1995, which set Husband's permanent 
obligation, comes to an additional $1,704.00. The total of these 
two figures ($14,484.00) exceeds the $10,035.00 difference between 
the $25,435.00 line of credit balance at trial and the $15,400.00 
amount consisting of the $14,000.00 balance at separation plus 
payment of $1,400.00 in property taxes on the home.19 Therefore, 
Husband's use of the line of credit was reasonable and necessary 
and matched his inability to meet his monthly temporary support 
obligation. 
Accordingly, Husband cannot fairly be required to pay all of 
the HELC. The burden of the HELC must be equally shared between 
the parties and the trial court abused its discretion in ordering 
Husband to pay excessive temporary support without crediting such 
excess back through the property-debt settlement. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO 
IMPUTE FULL-TIME WORK INCOME TO WIFE FOR PURPOSES OF 
COMPUTING CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY 
In Finding of Fact number 6, the Court stated: 
19Loan fees represent some portion of the difference. However, 
no testimony was given as to the exact amount of the loan fees. 
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The Court finds that during the course of the 
marriage, the Plaintiff has always worked part-time since 
the birth of the children. Her part-time work schedule 
was discussed by the parties and agreed upon by both 
parties. In addition the Court finds, based upon the 
testimony of Dr. Stewart, that it is beneficial to the 
children's welfare that the Plaintiff not work full-time 
so that she can be available to the children when they 
come home from school. The Court further believes, that 
based upon the finances of the parties that the parties 
can afford the arrangement. 
(R. 1637-8) 
The following facts support, or partially support, the Court's 
finding: The parties have two sons, Mikell Anthony Bova, born 
March 8, 1984, and Christopher Melle Bova, born May 17, 1987. (R. 
1882) 
Wife testified that after Mikell was about one year old, Wife 
returned to work part-time and worked about one day per week, that 
Husband agreed that Wife should just work part-time and did not 
insist that she work full-time. (R. 1890-93) Wife was working 
about two and one-half days per week when Christopher was born. 
She then took maternity leave for a year with Husband's consent. 
When Christopher was fourteen months old, Wife returned to work as 
a paralegal working two days per week about two to three hours each 
day, again with Husband's consent. (R. 1896-8) The parties then 
separated for two and one-half years and the children lived with 
Wife. During this time Wife worked approximately 20 to 25 hours 
per week as a paralegal with a flexible schedule. This lasted 
until Mikell was in kindergarten in 1991. Wife then reconciled 
with Husband in 1991 at which time the parties moved from New 
Mexico to Utah. (R. 1882, 1900-01) Husband agreed that Wife did 
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not have to work if she did not want to due to Husband's income. 
(R. 1903) Wife went to work for Snow Christensen as a nurse 
paralegal in October, 1991 and worked 25 to 30 hour weeks on a 
flexible schedule to accommodate Wife's commitment to the children 
and because Wife was a "wimp about driving in the snow" from Park 
City. Husband agreed to the arrangement because neither party 
wanted the children in full-time day care. (R. 1907-8) Wife left 
Snow Christensen in August, 1994, the same time she filed for 
divorce. (R. 1908, 1922) At that time she was making $23.75 per 
hour. (R. 2464) 
Wife went to work as a nurse paralegal at Richards, Brandt, 
Miller & Nelson in October, 1994, at $15.00 per hour. Wife was 
under the impression she could work flexible hours, but was 
terminated on December, 1994, by the firm for leaving work daily at 
3:30 p.m. to be home when her children returned home from school 
despite the firm's expectations that she work full days. (R. 1967-
1975) 
At the time of trial in October, 1995, Wife worked for Kipp 
and Christian at $18.50 per hour. Wife had flexible hours and 
could set her own schedule. (R. 2212) Wife testified: 
Q You understand that you can work ten hours a day two 
days a week or five hours for four days or four hours for five days 
or anything like that? 
A Sounds flexible. 
Q You understand that to be the case, that you have an 
absolutely flexible schedule? 
A Yes. 
Q And you can basically set your own schedule? 
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A I can. 
(R. 2122) 
Later Wife testified that though she enjoyed flexibility Mr. 
Christian preferred that she keep a regular schedule. (R. 2470) 
Wife acknowledged that the parties had used a full-time nanny 
when she worked at Snow Christensen and that before both children 
were in school she used day care providers. (R. 2470) 
Contrary to the Court's finding, Dr. Stewart never testified 
that Wife needed to be with the children after school.20 Dr. 
Stewart did at page 3 of her Recommendations in her custody 
evaluation state: 
D. Ability to Provide Personal Rather than Surrogate 
Care. Both parents could adjust their schedules to 
provide personal care after school hours rather than 
having to work until five or six in the evening. It is 
essential for these boys to have someone at home when 
they return from school because they are at an age when 
they want to talk about problems or other matters 
concerning their lives. These boys should not be left on 
their own during after school hours because of their need 
for someone to be available to them. This is more 
important for these children than it is for children who 
are not in a similar situation. (emphasis added.) 
(R. 451) 
The trial court abused its discretion in not imputing full-
time income to Wife. First, the Court failed to distinguish that 
the initial agreements by Husband that Wife work only part-time 
clearly related to years where the children were very young. 
Second, after the parties moved to Utah, Husband had agreed that 
Wife need only work part-time because the parties, residing 
20Husband has diligently searched Dr. Stewart's testimony, 
including using "school" in a word search of the transcript floppy 
disk. Husband has been unable to find any such testimony. 
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together as a unit, could afford the luxury. Husband's consent to 
part-time work clearly was not based upon an assumption of the 
parties having two households. 
Third, and most significant, the court's finding completely 
ignored the visitation schedule as it relates to Wife's testimony 
that she could work very flexible hours. Dr. Stewart's 
recommendation recognized that both parents had flexible schedules 
which could and should be adjusted to meet the children's needs. 
Dr. Stewart did not recommend that either parent limit employment 
hours, but did strongly urge that employment hours be adjusted. 
Husband has the children after school from Wednesday until 
before school on Monday at least once a month and after school on 
Thursday until before school on Monday at least once per month. 
During the summer Husband has the children from 1:00 p.m. on 
alternating Wednesdays or Thursdays. (R. 1636, Finding of Fact 5) 
This provides Wife with at least ten week days every month where 
she may work full-time or longer days.21 It also provides her with 
at least four weekend days each month when she may work to make up 
the average five hours per week missed in meeting the children 
after school on Mondays, Tuesdays and sometimes on Wednesdays. The 
trial court erred in failing to consider these facts. 
Despite granting Husband at least ten "after school days" each 
month, the trial court did not reduce Husband's anticipated income. 
Neither should it have done so for Wife. Section 78-45-4(1), Utah 
21Wife also has a full month during the summer to work 
uninterrupted when the children are with Husband. 
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Code Annotated provides, "Every woman shall support her child ..." 
Sections 78-45-7.5(6) and (7), Utah Code Annotated, provide that 
income will be imputed where a parent is under-employed. This 
Court has also imputed income for purposes of determining alimony 
as well as child support. Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963, 965-6, (Utah 
App. 1994), Willey v. Willey, 914 P.2d 1149, 1152 (Utah App. 
1996) ("Willey IX"), Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 553-554 (Utah 
App. 1993) ("Willey I"), Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1023-1026 
(Utah App. 1993). 
The trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider 
the time-frames and circumstances of Husband's agreements that Wife 
work only part-time and Wife's ability to work full-time week days 
when the children are with Husband and to work weekends when the 
children are with Husband. 
This Court should remand with instructions for the trial court 
to consider these issues and enter new findings reflecting the 
amount of child support and alimony. If income is not imputed for 
Wife it must be reduced for Husband to reflect his need to meet the 
children after school at least ten days each month. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING CHILD 
SUPPORT BY IMPUTING 100 PERCENT OF INCOME AT THE MAXIMUM 
TABLE AMOUNT TO HUSBAND AND ZERO TO WIFE WHERE HUSBAND'S 
INCOME DID NOT MEET THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT AND WIFE HAD 
SUBSTANTIAL INCOME 
Wife is a registered nurse who was employed by Kipp and 
Christian as a nurse paralegal approximately 25 to 30 hours per 
week at the rate of $18.50 per hour. (R. 1638) Husband has a 
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medical degree with board certification in emergency medicine and 
sports medicine. At the time of trial Husband was employed as an 
independent contractor at the Spine Center in West Valley City. (R. 
2262-2265) Husband's 1994 Form 1099 reflected income of 
$123,869.50 before Husband's business expenses to be claimed on 
Schedule C.22 (Exh. P-17, P18) The trial court found Husband's 
annual income to be $124,600.00 before and $115,000.00 after 
business expenses, breaking down to $9,583.00 per month after 
$800.00 business expenses per month, but before taxes. (R. 1147, 
1638, 2286, Finding of Fact 6) For purposes of Husband's appeal, 
Husband accepts these findings by the trial court.23 
Husband challenges the manner in which the trial court 
determined Husband's $1,400.00 per month child support obligation. 
After a hard fought custody battle, the parties stipulated to a 
custody/visitation arrangement whereby Wife received custody of the 
two children but Husband, inter alia, would have the children from 
Wednesday evening to Monday morning on one alternating week and 
from Thursday evening to Monday morning on the next alternating 
week. This arrangement plus holidays resulted in Husband having 
possession of the children over thirty-three percent of the time.24 
22Def endant also earned an additional $1,174 . 44 during 1994 
working for the Park City Ski Port. (R. 2286, Exh. P-18) 
23Husband reserves the right to challenge both the Court's 
determination of his gross income and his monthly business expenses 
in order to defend against Wife's cross appeal. 
24Without counting holidays, Husband has the children three 
days per week for 2 6 weeks (78 days) , a fourth day each other 
alternating week for 13 weeks (13 days) and four weeks each summer 
(28 days). These total to 119 days before considering 
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As part of the custody/visitation stipulation it was "also 
agreed that, irrespective of the amount of time that the defendant 
has with the children during any given month, that child support 
will be calculated on the sole-custody support worksheet." (R. 
2056, 2060) 
The trial court's memorandum decision and the parties' written 
memoranda which followed revealed that the Court, Wife and Husband 
each had a different construction of the meaning of the 
stipulation. The trial court's memorandum decision assessed 
Husband's child support obligation at $1,400.00 per month which 
corresponds to the table's $1,400.00 amount for the $10,000.00 
maximum assuming Husband earned $10,000.00 and Wife earned nothing. 
(R. 1638) Wife, assuming Husband's gross income to be $9,583.00, 
argued that the stipulation meant that the Court would extrapolate 
beyond the schedule and argued that Husband should be assessed 
$1,944.00. (R. 1172-1174, 1178) Husband argued that the 
stipulation meant that each party would pay her/his respective 
proportional share of the maximum $1,400.00, and that his pro-rata 
share was $1,106.00 based upon his assumed gross income of 
$8,783.00. (R. 1244-5, 1280) The trial stayed with its ruling 
that Husband was to pay $1,400.00 per month without explaining how 
it arrived at its figure. (R. 1638-9, Finding of Fact 7) 
The trial court erred in not applying the stipulation of the 
parties according to its language. By the express terms of the 
stipulation the trial court was obligated to calculate the amount 
holiday visitation. 
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of support "on the sole custody worksheet." As the trial court and 
parties were aware when the stipulation was entered, the worksheet 
only accepts combined incomes to $10,000.00. Therefore, the trial 
court was obligated to assess Father's support obligation by 
reference to his pro rata portion of the parties' combined incomes 
as applied to the $1,400.00 maximum table amount. Father's proper 
support level therefore comes to $1,12 0.00 based a combined 
earnings of $11,969.00 [$9,583.00 + $2,386.00 = $11,969.00] 
[$9, 583.00/$ll,969.00 = 80%]25 [8 0%*$1,4 00.00=$1,12 0.00] Accordingly, 
this Court should remand with instructions to enter support in such 
amount or lower if it finds that additional income should be 
imputed to Wife as argued below. 
Alternatively, the trial court erred in extrapolating beyond 
the table while failing to make specific findings on "all 
appropriate and just" factors required by Section 78-45-7.12, Utah 
Code Annotated, to allow this Court to determine whether it abused 
its discretion. In Ball v. Peterson, 912 P. 2d 1006, 1014 (Utah 
App. 1996), the Court stated, 
We agree with Mr. Peterson that in cases such as 
his, where the parties' income exceeds the highest 
monthly combined adjusted gross income listed on the 
statutory table, linear extrapolation of the child 
support obligation table alone is not enough. Strict 
reliance on linear extrapolation would be erroneous, 
because taken to the extreme, a child could be awarded 
support vastly exceeding any reasonable need. Rather, a 
trial judge must consider and make specific findings on 
all "appropriate and just" factors. We conclude the 
trial court's findings are insufficient for us to 
determine whether the court exceeded the limits of its 
25Husband's percentage may be less than 80% if Wife's 
additional ability to earn is imputed per Point IV. 
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discretion. Accordingly, we remand for proper child 
support findings and an award consistent with those 
findings. 
Particularly where Defendant has the children over thirty-four 
percent of the time, it would be an abuse of discretion for the 
trial court to have engaged in any extrapolation. The trial 
court's failure to explain its ruling requires that the case be 
remanded with the trial court required to enter clear and adequate 
findings which may be reviewed by this Court. 
Finally, the trial court may have felt bound by Section 78-45-
7.12, Utah Code Annotated, to assess the entire $1,400.00 against 
Father even though Father does not make $10,000.00 and Wife earns 
$2,405.00 per month. Section 78-45-7.12 states: 
If the combined adjust gross income exceeds the 
highest level specified in the table, an appropriate and 
just child support shall be ordered on a case-by-case 
basis, but the amount ordered may not be less than the 
highest level specified in the table for the number of 
children due support. 
Only the trial court can say whether its ruling was based on this 
statute, but if it were so, Father must be allowed to challenge 
this construction of the statute and/or to challenge the 
constitutionality of the statute on due process and equal 
protection grounds, since it is patently wrong for the statute to 
require that he pay child support on the assumption that he earns 
$10,000.00 and Wife earns zero where the facts are wholly contrary. 
Rather than start a constitutional battle at this stage without 
knowing the trial court's rationale for its ruling, this Court 
should remand the case to allow the trial court to clarify its 
findings and to allow the parties to respond thereto. However, if 
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this Court were to be inclined to rely upon Section 7.45-7.12 to 
uphold the trial court's ruling, Father should be allowed to fully 
brief the Court on how he has been denied due process and equal 
protection by the statute.26 
The trial court's failure to enter specific findings 
explaining the basis of its ruling requires that this Court remand 
for the entry of such specific findings. Ball, supra., Breinholt 
v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 881 (Utah App. 1995). 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT AWARDING THE 
TAX DEPENDENCY EXEMPTIONS TO HUSBAND 
The trial court awarded Wife the right to claim the children 
on her taxes as dependency exemptions, granting Husband the right 
to purchase such exemptions. (R. 1646, Finding of Fact number 17) 
Husband claims error based upon the court's failure to enter 
specific findings and to consider Husband's high child support 
obligation, the extensive visitation time Husband was granted with 
the children, Wife's ability to work 40 hours per week, and 
Husband's inadequate property award. 
This Court in Allred v. Allred, 835 P. 2d 974, 977-8 (Utah App. 
1992), thoroughly discussed the law of awarding tax dependency 
exemptions: 
To consider whether the court properly awarded the 
exemption, we rely on Motes v. Motes, 786 P. 2d 232 (Utah 
App. 1989). To permit appropriate appellate review of a 
26Husband' s constitutional rights are violated by a statute 
which creates an irrebuttable presumption not grounded in reality 
and which, in violation of equal protection, assesses husbands with 
wives with no income less than husbands with wives who have income. 
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trial court's application of the law, the trial court 
must have made adequate factual findings. Walters v. 
Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah App. 1991) . The "findings 
'should be sufficiently detailed and include enough 
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the 
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.' 
11
 Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P. 2d 199, 2 02-03 (Utah 
App.1987) (quoting Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 
(Utah 1987)). "Indeed, it would be an abuse of 
discretion for a divorce court to order a custodial 
parent to sign the [tax-exemption waiver] in the absence 
of appropriately supported findings to that effect." 
Motes, 786 P.2d at 239. 
The Federal Tax Code presumes the custodial parent 
should receive the dependency exemption. 26 U.S.C. Sec. 
152(e) (1988). The custodial parent may waive the 
exemption by signing "a written declaration . . . that such 
custodial parent will not claim such child as a 
dependent." 26 U.S.C. Sec. 152(e)(2)(A). Utah courts 
have recognized that in some cases it may be in the best 
interest of the child for the custodial parent to waive 
the tax exemption in favor of the noncustodial parent. 
Motes, 786 P. 2d at 239. In such cases, the court may 
order the custodial parent to sign a declaration of 
waiver consistent with Section 152 of the Tax Code. Id. 
Motes recognizes the presumption created by federal 
tax law that the custodial parent receive the exemption 
and outlines those circumstances where the presumption 
can be rebutted: 
use of the power to order a custodial parent 
to execute a section 152 declaration should 
not be used to evenly or otherwise divide the 
available exemptions without regard to the 
particular economic realities. On the 
contrary, it should be limited to those 
situations where the non-custodial parent has 
the higher income and provides the majority of 
support for the child or children whose 
exemption is claimed--support at a level which 
can be increased as a result of a reduction in 
his or her tax burdens. Indeed, it would be 
an abuse of discretion for a divorce court to 
order a custodial parent to sign the 
declaration in the absence of appropriately 
supported findings to that effect or 
demonstrating other exceptional circumstances 
making it in the best interest of the parties 
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and their children that the declarations be 
signed. 
Id. In short, the requirements are twofold. First, 
the noncustodial parent must have a higher income and 
provide the majority of support for the child. Second, 
the trial court must, from its findings, determine that 
by transferring the dependency exemption to the 
noncustodial parent, it is not only in the best interest 
of the parties, but, more importantly, also in the best 
interest of the child, which in all but exceptional 
circumstances would translate into an increased support 
level for the child. 
The trial court must specify in its findings the 
reasons the exemption is given to the noncustodial 
parent, in accordance with Motes. 
From the findings, it is apparent the trial court 
did not consider either of these requirements. (FN1) By 
failing to apply both Motes requirements, the court erred 
as a matter of law. We therefore reverse the award of 
the exemption to Husband and remand for an award 
consistent with the standards outlined in Motes. 
Here it is clear that Husband has the higher income and 
provides a majority of support for the children. Further, it is in 
the best interests of the children that the exemption go to Husband 
for the following exceptional reasons: 
First, Husband has been ordered to pay $1,400.00 per month 
support, even though his income does not exceed the maximum amount 
of the child support table and even though such amount allocates no 
income to Wife. 
Second, Husband has the children for extended periods of 
visitation beyond the regular visitation guidelines, from Wednesday 
or Thursday evenings to Monday mornings every other week. Such 
extended visitation results in added support expenses for Husband 
such as food and entertainment beyond that associated with regular 
visitation. 
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Third, the trial court failed to impute income to Wife for 
time she has available to work when the children are with Husband, 
thus leaving Wife with less need for the exemption. 
Fourth, the trial court failed to consider its inequitable 
distribution of property and its effect upon Husband's need for the 
exemptions. 
Finally, the trial court failed to enter specific findings 
explaining its failure to award the exemptions to Husband. Motes, 
Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 881 (Utah App. 1995) 
This Court must award Husband the exemptions or remand with 
instructions for the trial court to reconsider its ruling in light 
of the above factors. 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING WIFE 
ATTORNEYS FEES WHERE WIFE WAS WITHOUT NEED, HUSBAND WAS 
WITHOUT ABILITY TO PAY AND ADEQUATE FINDINGS WERE NOT 
ENTERED 
The trial court ordered that Husband pay $15,000.00 for Wife's 
attorney's fees out of Husband's one-half equity in the marital 
home. (Exh. P-10, R. 1643-4, 2194, 2450-1, Finding of Fact number 
13, R. 1647, Finding of Fact number 19) The court's original 
minute entry stated, 
The court finds defendant has far greater ability to 
earn income than plaintiff, that he had the ability to 
pay attorneys fees and that plaintiff has a need for fees 
and awards plaintiff $15,000.00 in fees. 
(R. 114 9) Finding of Fact number 19, ultimately signed by the 
trial court was greatly expanded to state: 
The Court finds that the income of the Defendant is 
far in excess of that income earned by Plaintiff. The 
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Court finds that the Defendant had, throughout the course 
of these divorce proceedings, adequate funds from his 
monthly salary to pay his attorney's fees and that in 
addition, he had enough funds to pay for his living 
expenses. On the other hand, the Court finds that the 
Plaintiff's income per month is approximately one quarter 
of that earned by Defendant and that all of the 
Plaintiff's monthly income is used to pay for necessary 
living expenses. The Court finds that the Plaintiff does 
not have the ability to pay her attorney's fees after she 
has paid her monthly expenses. The Court finds that 
Plaintiff has incurred attorney's fees in this matter 
with a balance owing thereon, prior to trial, of 
$15,036.00 and that she had incurred additional attorneys 
fees and costs for three days of trial; that the 
attorney's fees and costs incurred by the Plaintiff were 
reasonable and necessary in order to represent her; that 
the Plaintiff was forced to incur fees in opposing five 
motions made by Defendant to lower his child support 
and/or alimony obligations which motions were denied each 
time by the Court; and that the Plaintiff was forced to 
incur attorney's fees and costs in filing motions to 
compel to obtain information regarding the Defendant's 
financial records. The Court finds that the Plaintiff 
has a need for attorney's fees; that the Defendant has a 
greater ability to earn income than the Plaintiff; that 
the Defendant has the ability to pay for Plaintiff's 
attorney's fees; and the Court awards the Plaintiff 
$15,000.00 in attorneys fee's. 
(R. 1647) 
The decision whether to award attorney s rees rests witn the 
trial court's sound discretion, Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 123 
(Utah App. 1990) , but such discretion must be exercised within the 
framework of appellate court rulings. In Haumont v. Haumont, 793 
P.2d 421, 425-6 (Utah App. 1990) this court reviewed the 
requirements for an award of attorney's fees in a divorce action: 
To recover attorney fees in a divorce action, the 
moving party must show evidence (1) establishing the 
financial need of the requesting party, and (2) 
demonstrating the reasonableness of the amount of the 
award. Munns v. Munns, 790 P. 2d 116, 123 (Utah 
Ct .App.1990) ; Asper v. Asper, 753 P.2d 978, 982 (Utah 
Ct.App.1988) ; Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 368 (Utah 
Ct.App.1988). In determining the reasonableness of 
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claimed attorney fees, this court has stated: 
Reasonable attorney fees are not measured by 
what an attorney actually bills, nor is the 
number of hours spent on the case 
determinative in computing fees. In 
determining the reasonableness of attorneys 
fees, ... [a] court may consider, among other 
factors, the difficulty of the litigation, the 
efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the 
case, the reasonableness of the number of 
hours spent on the case, the fee customarily 
charged in the locality for similar services, 
the amount involved in the case and the result 
attained, and the expertise and experience of 
the attorneys involved. 
Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P. 2d 1331, 1336 (Utah 
Ct.App.1988) (quoting Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 
624-25 (Utah 1985)); see also Porco, 752 P.2d at 368. 
If either financial need or reasonableness has not 
been shown, we have reversed awards of attorney fees. 
Munns, 790 P. 2d at 123; see Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 
P.2d 1276, 1280 (Utah 1987); Asper, 753 P.2d 982. 
Furthermore, "[w]here the evidence supporting the 
reasonableness of requested attorney fees is both 
adequate and entirely undisputed, . . . the court abuses 
its discretion in awarding less than the amount requested 
unless the reduction is warranted" by one or more of the 
above factors. Martindale v. Adams, 111 P.2d 514, 518 
(Utah Ct.App. 1989). The trial court must, accordingly, 
identify such factors on the record and also explain its 
sua sponte reduction in order to permit meaningful review 
on appeal. Id. 
Husband's ability to pay must also be considered. In Marshall v. 
Marshall, 915 P.2d 508, 516-7 (Utah App. 1996) the Court stated: 
...The trial court has the authority to award attorney 
fees in a divorce action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
30-3-3 (1995). However, the decision to make such an 
award " 'must be based on evidence of the financial need 
of the receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse 
to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees./ff 
Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 555 (Utah App.1993) 
(quoting Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah 
App.1991)). The failure to consider any of the 
enumerated factors is ground for reversal on the fee 
issue. See id. at 556; Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 77 
(Utah App.1991). 
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The court's finding that Husband, throughout the course of 
these proceedings, had adequate funds from his monthly salary to 
pay his attorney's fees is completely contradicted by the court's 
finding after trial on the merits that Husband could only afford to 
pay $2,600.00 combined child support and alimony monthly whereas 
its temporary order had required Husband to pay $3,134.00 for 
temporary support and alimony and $318.00 for disability insurance, 
a difference of $852.00. Husband's monthly deficit was covered by 
accessing the Home Equity Line of Credit for about $10,000.00 which 
in turn was assessed against Husband's share of property. 
Husband's share of the home equity was further burdened by the 
Court's failure to allocate capital gains taxes, leaving Husband 
with a potential tax liability upon sale of the home of 
$33, 600.00.27 Husband was also over-assessed $21,756.00 for non-
existent personal property, leaving Husband with far less than half 
of the marital property. Further, the trial court's allocation of 
the final child support and alimony award left Husband with little 
disposable income. (R. 1639-40, Finding of Fact number 9) 
In considering Wife's need, the court failed to consider 
Wife's ability to work full time due to Husband having the children 
between Wednesday or Thursday afternoons and Monday mornings on 
alternating weekends. It failed to consider that Wife had received 
a disproportionately high share of the property award by virtue of 
Husband being awarded non-existing assets and being burdened with 
27Additionally, Husband's attorneys placed liens of $3,908.30 
and $27,424.03 on Husband's home equity. (R. 1109-10, 1307-8) 
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tax liabilities.28 It ignored Wife's tax free award of $125, 0IL4-J5£APPFAI *% 
in home equity29 and of nearly $139,000.00 of retirement funds. 
Therefore, the trial court erred in finding that Wife had a 
financial need to assistance with attorney's fees. 
However, Finding of Fact number 19 refers to Husband making 
five different applications for relief from the temporary support 
awards, but fails to identify how much of the total $15,000.00 fees 
were attributable to such applications. Husband, in continued 
financial distress, did ask the court on four or five occasions to 
reduce his temporary support burden.30 (R. 183-190, 200, 280, 281-
287, 347, 359-363, 534-549, 1138-1143) The trial court's 
determination, following trial on the merits, that Husband was able 
to pay only $2,600.00 per month combined child support and alimony 
rather than -$£-r^ -34.00 per month confirmed that Husband was indeed 
A 
in financial distress and that his applications were made in good 
faith, as were husband's motions to increase the Home Equity Line 
of Credit. (R. 593, 754, 1138-1143) 
28Husband was over-assessed $21,756.50 in the personal property 
settlement and left with $33,600 in capital gains tax liability. 
See Points I and II, supra. 
29$385,000 appraised value of home less $176,165 mortgage 
balance less $18,000 IRA related taxes divided by two equals 
$95,417.50. To this from Husband's share of the home equity Wife 
received $29,597 to "balance" the personal property award, thus 
leaving Wife $125,014.50 of tax-free equity to be received 
from the home. Husband's share of the equity after capital gains 
taxes is $95,417.50-$29,597-$33,600 [capital gain taxes]=32,220.50 
30The last occasion was after trial and before the trial court 
entered its minute entry decision when Husband was again unable to 
make the house payment and again asked permission to increase the 
line of credit to $30,000. (R. 1138-41) 
47 
tax liabilities.28 It ignored Wife's tax free award of $125,014.50 
in home equity29 and of nearly $139,000.00 of retirement funds. 
Therefore, the trial court erred in finding that Wife had a 
financial need to assistance with attorney's fees. 
However, Finding of Fact number 19 refers to Husband making 
five different applications for relief from the temporary support 
awards, but fails to identify how much of the total $15,000.00 fees 
were attributable to such applications. Husband, in continued 
financial distress, did ask the court on four or five occasions to 
reduce his temporary support burden.30 (R. 183-190, 200, 280, 281-
287, 347, 359-363, 534-549, 1138-1143) The trial court's 
determination, following trial on the merits, that Husband was able 
to pay only $2,600.00 per month combined child support and alimony 
rather than $3,134.00 per month confirmed that Husband was indeed 
in financial distress and that his applications were made in good 
faith, as were husband's motions to increase the Home Equity Line 
of Credit. (R. 593, 754, 1138-1143) 
28Husband was over-assessed $21,756.50 in the personal property 
settlement and left with $33,600 in capital gains tax liability. 
See Points I and II, supra. 
29$385,000 appraised value of home less $176,165 mortgage 
balance less $18,000 IRA related taxes divided by two equals 
$95,417.50. To this from Husband's share of the home equity Wife 
received $29,597 to "balance" the personal property award, thus 
leaving Wife $125,014.50 of tax-free equity to be received 
from the home. Husband's share of the equity after capital gains 
taxes is $95,417.50-$29,597-$33,600 [capital gain taxes]=32,220.50 
30The last occasion was after trial and before the trial court 
entered its minute entry decision when Husband was again unable to 
make the house payment and again asked permission to increase the 
line of credit to $30,000. (R. 1138-41) 
47 
Further, Husband's requests for relief were often made 
ancillary to other motions for other relief which Wife was bound to 
respond to anyway. (R. 183-190, 200, 280, 534-549) 
Even if Husband were, arguendo, deemed to have asked the court 
for relief too many times, there was no breakdown in Wife's 
counsel's proffer regarding her attorney's fees as to which portion 
of the $15,000.00 related to Husband's repeated requests for 
relief. (R. 2450-1)31 For example, Wife was awarded only $500.00 
in attorney's fees after the hearing dated November 28, 1994, 
wherein the trial court also considered other issues such as 
visitation and access to a computer. (R. 280) Therefore, if a 
portion of the attorney's fees award were not vacated because this 
Court were concerned that Husband's repeated applications for 
relief may not have been necessary, the matter would need to be 
remanded for clarification of the actual portion of fees 
attributable to Husband's requests for relief and any fees related 
to Husband's failure to comply with discovery requests. The matter 
would also require the trial court to first find that Husband's 
conduct was in bad faith under Rule 11, URCP, in order to justify 
the award of attorney's fees in light of Wife's clear lack of 
need.32 
The trial court abused its discretion in finding need on the 
31Husband stipulated that Wife's overall proffer of attorney's 
fees was related to work performed. (R. 2451) 
32Given the trial court's determination that Husband's 
temporary support order was in fact $537 too high each month, there 
is a dearth of evidence to support a finding of bad faith. 
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part of Wife, in failing to consider its inadequate property award 
to Husband and in failing to consider the lack of evidence of fees 
attributable to Husband's repeated applications for relief, if such 
were deemed improper. 
CONCLUSION 
Husband has not challenged the decree granting each party a 
divorce. However, the other rulings of the trial court addressed 
herein must be reversed and the case remanded. The trial court 
must be instructed to properly credit husband's property settlement 
$21,756.50, to order Wife to be responsible for one-half of the 
capital gains taxes from the sale of the home, to order Wife to be 
responsible for one-half of the home equity loan balance between 
$14,000.00 and $25,435.00 [($25,435.00-$14,000.00)/2 = $5,717.50] , to 
impute full-time income to Wife for purposes of child support and 
alimony, to allocate child support pro rata on the parties' incomes 
at a maximum income of $10,000.00, to award Husband the tax 
dependency exemptions, and to order Wife to pay her own attorney's 
fees. 
DATED this day of June, 1997. 
PAUL W. MORTENS EN 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT A T i t l e 30-3-5 Utah Code, as amended. 
EXHIBIT B Title 78-45-7 Utah Code, as amended. 
EXHIBIT C 26 U.S.C. § 1 
EXHIBIT D 26 U.S.C. § 1034 
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30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and 
health care of parties and children — Division of 
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — 
Custody and visitation — Determination of ali-
mony — Nonmeritorious petition for modifica-
tion. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it 
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and 
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
lb) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order 
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, 
and dental care insurance for the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of 
joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or 
incurred during marriage; 
fii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or 
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabili-
ties and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; 
Cd) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, 
Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5; and 
(e) with regard to child support orders issued or modified on or after 
January i , 1994. that are subject to income withholding, an order 
assessing against the obligor an additional 57 per month check processing 
fee to be included in the amount withheld and paid to the Office of 
Recover:/ Services within the Department of Human Sen/ices for the 
purposes of income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, 
Parts 4 and 5. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for ail or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide 
child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, 
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for 
debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best 
interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer 
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a visitation 
schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to 
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under this chapter. 
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a 
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the 
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if 
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or 
defended against in good faith. 
16) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order by 
a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursuant to 
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted by the 
court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual 
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the 
other Dartv's failure to Drovide or exercise court-ordered visitation. 
EXHIBIT A 
'7) I'a; The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining 
alimony: 
i"i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or abilitvr to produce income; 
•:'iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 
!'iv) the length of the marriage. 
i'bi The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining 
alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, 
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance 
with Subsection (a.). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts 
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the 
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short 
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the 
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the 
time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equal-
ize the parties' respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a 
major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective 
efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital 
property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's 
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both 
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating 
adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, 
and no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the 
court may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at 
the time of the marriage. 
''g; (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive 
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial 
material change in circumstances not forseeable at the time of the 
divorce. 
(ii; The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for 
alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time 
the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circum-
stances that justify that action. 
('iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse 
of the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this 
subsection. 
(A; The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial 
ability to share living expenses. 
<B> The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse 
if the court finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that 
consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number 
of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination 
of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the 
payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates 
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is 
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the 
party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights 
are determined. 
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paving alimony that the former 
spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
EXHIBIT A 
78-45-7. Determination of amount of support — Rebut-
table guidelines. 
(1) (a) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted by prior 
court order unless there has been a material change of circumstance on 
the part of the obligor or obligee. 
(b) If the prior court order contains a stipulated provision for the 
automatic adjustment for prospective support, the prospective support 
shall be the amount as stated in the order, without a showing of a material 
change of circumstances, if the stipulated provision: 
(i) is clear and unambiguous; 
(ii) is self-executing; 
(iii) provides for support which equals or exceeds the base child 
support award required by the guidelines; and 
(iv) does not allow a decrease in support as a result of the obligor's 
voluntary reduction of income. 
(2) If no prior court order exists, or a material change in circumstances has 
occurred, the court determining the amount of prospective support shall 
require each party to file a proposed award of child support using the 
guidelines before an order awarding child support or modifying an existing 
award may be granted. 
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines, the court 
shall establish support after considering all relevant factors, including but not 
limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn: 
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child; 
(f) the ages of the parties: and 
(g) the responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for the support of 
others. 
(4) When no prior court order exists, the court shall determine and assess all 
arrearages based upon the Uniform Child Support Guidelines described in this 
chapter. 
EXHIBIT B 
INCOME TAXES 26 USCS § 1 
"U. General stock ownership corporations." 
In 1982, P.L. 97-354, Sec. 5(b), amended Subchapter S. 
Prior to amendment, Subchapter S read as follows: "S. Election of certain small business 
corporations as to taxable status." 
In 1978, P.L. 95-600, Sec. 601(c)(1), added Subchapter U. 
In 1962, P.L. 87-834, added subchapter T. 
In 1960, P.L. 86-779, added to subchapter M the words "and real estate investment trusts." 
In 1958, P.L. 85-866, added subchapter S. 
SUBCHAPTER A. Determination of Tax Liability 
Part 
I. Tax on individuals. 
II. Tax on corporations. 
III. Changes in rates during a taxable year. 
IV. Credits against tax. 
V. Repealed. 
VI. Minimum tax for tax preferences. 
VII. Environment tax. 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
Amendments: 
In 1986, P.L. 99-499, Sec. 516(b)(5), added Part VII. 
In 1976, P.L. 94-455, Sec. 1901(b)(2), deleted Part V. 
In 1969, P.L. 91-172, Sec. 301(b)(1), added Part VI. 
In 1968, P.L. 90-364, added Part V. 
PART I. TAX ON INDIVIDUALS 
Sec. 
1. Tax imposed. 
2. Definitions and special rules. 
3. Tax tables for individuals having taxable income of less than $20,000 
4. Repealed. 
5. Cross references relating to tax on individuals. 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
Amendments: 
In 1976, P.L. 94-455, Sec. 501(c)(1), amended item 3 and deleted item 4, which previously 
read "Optional tax tables for individuals" and "Rules for optional tax," respectively. 
In 1969, P.L. 91-172, Sec. 803(d)(9), amended items 2 and 3 which previously read "Tax in 
case of joint return or return of surviving spouse." and "Optional tax if adjusted gross income 
is less than $5,000." respectively. 
§ 1. Tax imposed. 
(a) Married individuals filing joint returns and surviving spouses. There is hereby imposed on 
the taxable income of— 
(1) every married individual (as defined in section 7703) who makes a single return jointly 
with his spouse under section 6013, and 
(2) every surviving spouse (as defined in section 2(a)), a tax determined in accordance with 
the following table: 
If taxable income is: The tax is: 
Not over $36,900 15% of taxable income. 
Over $36,900 but not over $89,150 $5,535, plus 28% of the excess over 
$36,900. 
Over $89,150 but not over $140,000 $20,165, plus 31% of the excess over 
$89,150. 
Over $140,000 but not over $250,000 $35,928.50, plus 36% of the excess over 
$140,000. 
Over $250,000 $75,528.50, plus 39.6% of the excess over 
$250,000. 
(b) Heads of households. There is hereby imposed on the taxable income of every head of a 
household (as defined in section 2(b)) a tax determined in accordance with the following table: 
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If taxable income is: The tax is: 
Not over $29,600 15% of taxable income. 
Over $29,600 but not over $76,400 $4,440, plus 28% of the excess over 
$29,600. 
Over $76,400 but not over $127,500 $17,544, plus 31 % of the excess over 
$76,400. 
Over $127,500 but not over $250,000 $33,385, plus 36% of the excess over 
$127,500. 
Over $250,000 $77,485, plus 39.6% of the excess over 
$250,000. 
(c) Unmarried individuals (other than surviving spouses and heads of households). There is 
hereby imposed on the taxable income of every individual (other than a surviving spouse as 
defined in section 2(a) or the head of a household as defined in section 2(b)) who is not a mar-
ried individual (as defined in section 7703) a tax determined in accordance with the following 
table: 
If taxable income is: The tax is: 
Not over $22,100 15% of taxable income. 
Over $22,100 but not over $53,500 $3,315, plus 28% of the excess over 
$22,100. 
Over $53,500 but not over $115,000 $12,107, plus 31% of the excess over 
$53,500. 
Over $115,000 but not over $250,000 $31,172, plus 36% of the excess over 
$115,000. 
Over $250,000 $79,772, plus 39.6% of the excess over 
$250,000. 
(d) Married individuals filing separate returns. There is hereby imposed on the taxable income 
of every married individual (as defined in section 7703) who does not make a single return 
jointly with his spouse under section 6013, a tax determined in accordance with the following 
table: 
If taxable income is: The tax is: 
Not over $18,450 15% of taxable income. 
Over $18,450 but not over $44,575 $2,767.50, plus 28% of the excess over 
$18,450. 
Over $44,575 but not over $70,000 $10,082.50, plus 31% of the excess over 
$44,575. 
Over $70,000 but not over $125,000 $17,964.25, plus 36% of the excess over 
$70,000. 
Over $125,000 $37,764.25, plus 39.6% of the excess over 
$125,000. 
(e) Estates and trusts. There is hereby imposed on the taxable income of— 
(1) every estate, and 
(2) every trust, 
taxable under this subsection a tax determined in accordance with the following table: 
If taxable income is: The tax is: 
Not over $1,500 15 % of taxable income. 
Over $1,500 but not over $3,500 S225, plus 28% of the excess over $1,500. 
Over $3,500 but not over $5,500 $785, plus 31 % of the excess over $3,500. 
Over $5,500 but not over $7,500 $1,405, plus 36% of the excess over $5,500. 
Over $7,500 $2,125, plus 39.6% of the excess over 
$7,500. 
(f) Adjustments in tax tables so that inflation will not result in tax increases. (1) In general* 
Not later than December 15 of 1993, and each subsequent calendar year, the Secretary shall 
prescribe tables which shall apply in lieu of the tables contained in subsections (a), (b), (c), 
(d), and (e) with respect to taxable years beginning in the succeeding calendar year. 
(2) Method of prescribing tables. The table which under paragraph (1) is to apply in lieu oi 
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INCOME TAXES 26 USCS § 1 
the table contained in subsection (a), (b), (c), (d), or (e), as the case may be, with respect to 
taxable years beginning in any calendar year shall be prescribed— 
(A) by increasing the minimum and maximum dollar amounts for each rate bracket for 
which a tax is imposed under such table by the cost-of-living adjustment for such 
calendar year, 
(B) by not changing the rate applicable to any rate bracket as adjusted under subpara-
graph (A), and 
(C) by adjusting the amounts setting forth the tax to the extent necessary to reflect the 
adjustments in the rate brackets. 
(3) Cost-of-living adjustment. For purposes of paragraph (2), the cost-of-living adjustment 
for any calendar year is the percentage (if any) by which— 
(A) the CPI for the preceding calendar year, exceeds 
(B) the CPI for the calendar year 1992. 
(4) CPI for any calendar year. For purposes of paragraph (3), the CPI for any calendar year 
is the average of the Consumer Price Index as of the close of the 12-month period ending 
on August 31 of such calendar year. 
(5) Consumer price index. For purposes of paragraph (4), the term ''Consumer Price Index'* 
means the last Consumer Price Index for all-urban consumers published by the Department 
of Labor. For purposes of the preceding sentence, the revision of the Consumer Price Index 
which is most consistent with the Consumer Price Index for calendar year 1986 shall be 
used. 
(6) Rounding. (A) In general. If any increase determined under paragraph (2)(A), section 
63(c)(4), section 68(b)(2) or section 151(d)(4) is not a multiple of $50, such increase shall 
be rounded to the next lowest multiple of $50. 
(B) Table for married individuals filing separately. In the case of a married individual 
filing a separate return, subparagraph (A) (other than with respect to subsection (c)(4) 
of section 63 (as it applies to subsections (c)(5)(A) and (f) of such section) and section 
151(d)(4)(A)) shall be applied by substituting "$25" for "$50" each place it appears. 
(7) Special rule for certain brackets. (A) Calendar year 1994. In prescribing the tables under 
paragraph (1) which apply with respect to taxable years beginning in calendar year 1994, 
the Secretary shall make no adjustment to the dollar amounts at which the 36 percent 
rate bracket begins or at which the 39.6 percent rate begins under any table contained 
in subsection (a), (b), (c), (d), or (e). 
(B) Later calendar years. In prescribing tables under paragraph (1) which apply with 
respect to taxable years beginning in a calendar year after 1994, the cost-of-living adjust-
ment used in making adjustments to the dollar amounts referred to in subparagraph (A) 
shall be determined under paragraph (3) by substituting "1993" for "1992". 
(g) Certain unearned income of minor children taxed as if parent's income. (1) In general. In 
the case of any child to whom this subsection applies, the tax imposed by this section shall 
be equal to the greater of— 
(A) the tax imposed by this section without regard to this subsection, or 
(B) the sum of— 
(i) the tax which would be imposed by this section if the taxable income of such child 
for the taxable year were reduced by the net unearned income of such child, plus 
(ii) such child's share of the allocable parental tax. 
(2) Child to whom subsection applies. This subsection shall apply to any child for any tax-
able year if— 
(A) such child has not attained age 14 before the close of the taxable year, and 
(B) either parent of such child is alive at the close of the taxable year. 
(3) Allocable parental tax. For purposes of this subsection— 
(A) In general. The term "allocable parental tax" means the excess of— 
(i) the tax which would be imposed by this section on the parent's taxable income if 
such income included the net unearned income of all children of the parent to whom 
this subsection applies, over 
(ii) the tax imposed by this section on the parent without regard to this subsection. 
For purposes of clause (i), net unearned income of all children of the parent shall not be 
taken into account in computing any exclusion, deduction, or credit of the parent. 
(B) Child's share. A child's share of any allocable parental tax of a parent shall be equal 
to an amount which bears the same ratio to the total allocable parental tax as the child's 
net unearned income bears to the aggregate net unearned income of all children of such 
parent to whom this subsection applies. 
(C) Coordination with section 644. If tax is imposed under section 644(a)(1) with respect 
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to the sale or exchange of any property of which the parent was the transferor, for 
purposes of applying subparagraph (A) to the taxable year of the parent in which such 
sale or exchange occurs— 
(i) taxable income of the parent shall be increased by the amount treated as included 
in gross income under section 644(a)(2)(A)(i), and 
(ii) the amount described in subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be increased by the amount of 
the excess referred to in section 644(a)(2)(A). 
(D) Special rule where parent has different taxable year. Except as provided in regula-
tions, if the parent does not have the same taxable year as the child, the allocable parental 
tax shall be determined on the basis of the taxable year of the parent ending in the child's 
taxable year. 
(4) Net unearned income. For purposes of this subsection— 
(A) In general. The term "net unearned income" means the excess of— 
(i) the portion of the adjusted gross income for the taxable year which is not attribut-
able to earned income (as defined in section 911(d)(2)), over 
(ii) the sum of— 
(I) the amount in effect for the taxable year under section 63(c)(5)(A) (relating to 
limitation on standard deduction in the case of certain dependents), plus 
(II) the greater of the amount described in subclause (I) or, if the child itemizes 
his deductions for the taxable year, the amount of the itemized deductions allowed 
by this chapter for the taxable year which are directly connected with the produc-
tion of the portion of adjusted gross income referred to in clause (i). 
(B) Limitation based on taxable income. The amount of the net unearned income for any 
taxable year shall not exceed the individual's taxable income for such taxable year. 
(5) Special rules for determining parent to whom subsection applies. For purposes of this 
subsection, the parent whose taxable income shall be taken into account shall be— 
(A) in the case of parents who are not married (within the meaning of section 7703), the 
custodial parent (within the meaning of section 152(e)) of the child, and 
(B) in the case of married individuals filing separately, the individual with the greater 
taxable income. 
(6) Providing of parent's TIN. The parent of any child to whom this subsection applies for 
any taxable year shall provide the TIN of such parent to such child and such child shall 
include such TIN on the child's return of tax imposed by this section for such taxable year. 
(7) Election to claim certain unearned income of child on parent's return. (A) In general. 
If— 
(i) any child to whom this subsection applies has gross income for the taxable year 
only from interest and dividends (including Alaska Permanent Fund dividends), 
(ii) such gross income is more than the amount described in paragraph (4)(A)(ii)(I) 
and less than 10 times the amount so described, 
(iii) no estimated tax payments for such year are made in the name and TIN of such 
child, and no amount has been deducted and withheld under section 3406, and 
(iv) the parent of such child (as determined under paragraph (5)) elects the applica-
tion of subparagraph (B), 
such child shall be treated (other than [for] purposes of this paragraph) as having no 
gross income for such year and shall not be required to file a return under section 6012. 
(B) Income included on parent's return. In the case of a parent making the election 
under this paragraph— 
(i) the gross income of each child to whom such election applies (to the extent the 
gross income of such child exceeds twice the amount described in paragraph 
(4)(A)(ii)(I)) shall be included in such parent's gross income for the taxable year, 
(ii) the tax imposed by this section for such year with respect to such parent shall be 
the amount equal to the sum of— 
(I) the amount determined under this section after the application of clause (i), 
plus 
(II) for each such child. 15 percent of the lesser of the amount described in 
paragraph (4)(A)(ii)(I) or the excess of the gross income of such child over the 
amount so described, and 
(iii) any interest which is an item of tax preference under section 57(a)(5) of the child 
shall be treated as an item of tax preference of such parent (and not of such child). 
(C) Regulations. The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or 
appropriate to carry out the purposes of this paragraph. 
(h) Maximum capital gains rate. If a taxpayer has a net capital gain for any taxable year, then 
the tax imposed by this section shall not exceed the sum of— 
16 
EXHIBIT C 
INCOME TAXES 26 USCS § 1 
(1) a tax computed at the rates and in the same manner as if this subsection had not been 
enacted on the greater of— 
(A) taxable income reduced by the amount of the net capital gain, or 
(B) the amount of taxable income taxed at a rate below 28 percent, plus 
(2) a tax of 28 percent of the amount of taxable income in excess of the amount determined 
under paragraph (1). 
For purposes of the preceding sentence, the net capital gain for any taxable year shall be 
reduced (but not below zero) by the amount which the taxpayer elects to take into account as 
investment income for the taxable year under section 163(d)(4)(B)(iii). 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
Amendments: 
In 1996, P.L. 104-188, Sec. 1704(m)(l), (2) (applicable as provided by Sec. 1704(m)(4) of 
P.L. 104-188, which appears as a note to this section), amended subsec. (g)(7) by substitut-
ing cl. (ii) of subpara. (A) for one which read: "(ii) such gross income is more than $500 and 
less than $5,000,", by substituting "twice the amount described in paragraph (4)(A)(ii)(I)" 
for "$1,000" in cl. (i) of subpara. (B), and by substituting subcl. (II) of cl. (ii) of subpara. 
(B) for one which read: "(II) for each such child, the lesser of $75 or 15 percent of the excess 
of the gross income of such child over $500, and". 
In 1993, P.L. 103-152, Sec. 1, provides: "This Act [for full classification, consult USCS 
Tables volumes] may be cited as the 'Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1993'.". 
P.L. 103-66, Sec. 13001(a), provides: "Short title. This chapter [Title XIII, Chapter 1; for 
full classification, consult USCS Tables volumes] may be cited as the 'Revenue Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1993* ". 
P.L. 103-66, Sec. 13201(a) (applicable to taxable years beginning after 12/31/92, as provided 
by Sec. 13201(c)), substituted subsecs. (a)—(e) for ones which read: 
"(a) Married individuals filing joint returns and surviving spouses. There is hereby imposed 
on the taxable income of— 
"(1) every married individual (as defined in section 7703) who makes a single return 
jointly with his spouse under section 6013, and 
"(2) every surviving spouse (as defined in section 2(a)), a tax determined in accordance 
with the following table: 
If taxable income is: The tax is: 
Not over $32,450 15% of taxable income. 
Over $32,450 but not over $78,400 $4,867.50, plus 28% of the excess over $32,450. 
Over $78,400 $17,733.50, plus 31% of the excess over $78,40C 
"(b) Heads of households. There is hereby imposed on the taxable income of every head of 
a household (as defined in section 2(b)) a tax determined in accordance with the following 
table: 
If taxable income is: The tax is: 
Not over $26,050 15% of taxable income. 
Over $26,050 but not over $67,200 $3,907.50, plus 28% of the excess over $26,500. 
Over $67,200 $15,429.50, plus 31 % of the excess over $67,200 
"(c) Unmarried individuals (other than surviving spouses and heads of households). There 
is hereby imposed on the taxable income of every individual (other than a surviving spouse 
as defined in section 2(a) or the head of a household as defined in section 2(b)) who is not a 
married individual (as defined in section 7703) a tax determined in accordance with the fol-
lowing table: 
If taxable income is: The tax is: 
Not over $19,450 15% of taxable income. 
Over $19,450 but not over $47,050 $2,917.50, plus 28% of the excess over $19,450. 
Over $47,050 $10,645.50, plus 31 % of the excess over $47,050. 
"(d) Married individuals filing separate returns. There is hereby imposed on the taxable 
income of every married individual (as defined in section 7703) who does not make a single 
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§ 1034. Rollover of gain on sale of principal residence. 
(a) Nonrecognition of gain. If propeny (in this section called 'old residence' ) used by the 
taxpayer as his principal residence is sold by him and, within a period beginning 2 years before 
the date ofsuch sale and ending 2 years after such date, property (in this section called 'new 
residence') is purchased and used by the taxpayer as his principal residence, gain (if any) from 
such sale shall be recognized only to the extent that the taxpayer's adjusted sales price (as 
defined in subsection (b)) of the old residence exceeds the taxpayer's cost of purchasing the new 
residence. 
(b) Adjusted sales price defined. (1) In general. For purposes of this section, the term Adjusted 
sales price' means the amount realized, reduced by the aggregate of the expenses for work 
performed on the old residence in order to assist in its sale. 
(2) Limitations. The reduction provided in paragraph (1) applies only to expenses— 
(A) for work performed during the 90-day period ending on the day on which the 
contract to sell the old residence is entered into; 
(B) which are paid on or before the 30th day after the date of the sale of the old residence; 
and 
(C) which are 
(i) not allowable as deductions in computing taxable income under section 63 (defin-
ing taxable income), and 
(ii) not taken into account in computing the amount realized from the sale of the old 
residence, 
(c) Rules for application of section. For purposes of this section: 
(1) .An exchange by the taxpayer of his residence for other property shall be treated as a 
sale of such residence, and the acquisition of a residence on the exchange of property shall 
be treated as a purchase of such residence. 
(2) A residence any pan of which was constructed or reconstructed by the taxpayer shall 
be treated as purchased by the taxpayer. In determining the taxpayer's cost of purchasing a 
residence, there shall be included only so much of his cost as is attributable to the acquisi-
tion, construction, reconstruction, and improvements made which are properly chargeable 
to capital account, during the period specified in subsection (a). 
(3) If a residence is purchased by the taxpayer before the date of his sale of the old residence, 
the purchased residence shall not be treated as his new residence if sold or otherwise 
disposed of by him before the date of the sale of the old residence. 
(4) If the taxpayer, during the period described in subsection (a), purchases more than one 
residence which is used by him as his principal residence at some time within 2 years after 
the date of the sale of the old residence, only the last of such residences so used by him after 
the date of such sale shall constitute the new residence. If a principal residence is sold in a 
sale to which subsection (d)(2) applies within 2 years after the sale of the old residence, tor 
purposes of applying the preceding sentence with respect to the old residence, the principal 
residence so sold shall be treated as the last residence used during such 2-year period. 
(d) Limitation. (1) In general. Subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to the sale of the 
taxpayer's residence if within 2 years before the date of such sale the taxpayer sold at a gatf 
other propeny used by him as his principal residence, and any pan of such gain was no 
recognized by reason of subsection (a). 
(2) Subsequent sale connected with commencing work at new place. Paragraph (1) shall no 
apply with respect to the sale of the taxpayer's residence if— 
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(A) such sale was in connection with the commencement of work by the taxpayer as an 
employee or as a self-employed individual at a new principal place of worknand 
(B) if the residence so sold is treated as the former residence for purposes of section 217 
(relating to moving expenses), the taxpayer would satisfy the conditions of subsection (c) 
of section 217 (as modified by the other subsections of such section). 
(e) Basis of new residence. Where the purchase of a new residence results, under subsection 
(a) or under section 112(n) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, in the nonrecognition of gain 
o n the sale of an old residence, in determining the adjusted basis of the new residence as of 
any time following the sale of the old residence, the adjustments to basis shall include a reduc-
tion by an amount equal to the amount of the gain not so recognized on the sale of the old 
residence. For this purpose, the amount of the gain not so recognized on the sale of the old 
residence includes only so much of such gain as is not recognised by reason of the cost, up to 
such time, of purchasing the new residence. 
(f) Tenant-stockholder in a cooperative housing corporation. For purposes of this section, sec-
tion 1016 (relating to adjustments to basis), and section 1223 (relating to holding period), refer-
ences to property used by the taxpayer as his principal residence, and references to the residence 
of a taxpayer, shall include stock held by a tenant-stockholder (as defined in section 216, relat-
ing to deduction for amounts representing taxes and interest paid to a cooperative housing 
corporation) in a cooperative housing corporation (as defined in such section) if— 
(1) in the case of stock sold, the house or apartment which the taxpayer was entitled to oc-
cupy as such stockholder was used by him as his principal residence, and 
(2) in the case of stock purchased, the taxpayer used as his principal residence the house or 
apartment which he was entitled to occupy as such stockholder. 
(g) Husband and wife. If the taxpayer and his spouse, in accordance with regulations which 
shall be prescribed by the Secretary pursuant to this subsection, consent to the application of 
paragraph (2) of this subsection, then— 
(1) for purposes of this section— 
(A) the taxpayer's adjusted sales price of the old residence is the adjusted sales price (of 
the taxpayer, or of the taxpayer and his spouse) of the old residence, and 
(B) the taxpayer's cost of purchasing the new residence is the cost (to the taxpayer, his 
spouse, or both) of purchasing the new residence (whether held by the taxpayer, his 
spouse, or the taxpayer and his spouse); and 
(2) so much of the gain on the sale of the old residence as is not recognized solely by reason 
of this subsection, and so much of the adjustment under subsection (e) to the basis of the 
new residence as results solely from this subsection shall be allocated between the taxpayer 
and his spouse as provided in such regulations. 
This subsection shall apply only if the old residence and the new residence are each used by 
the taxpayer and his spouse as their principal residence. In case the taxpayer and his spouse 
do not consent to the application of paragraph (2) of this subsection then the recognition of 
gain on the sale of the old residence shall be determined under this section without regard to 
the rules provided in this subsection. For purposes of this subsection, except to the extent 
provided in regulations, in the case of an individual who dies after the date of the sale of the 
old residence and is married on the date of death, consent to the application of paragraph (2) 
by such individual's spouse and use of the new residence as the principal residence of such 
spouse shall be treated as consent and use by such individual. 
(h) Members of armed forces. (1) In general. The running of any period of time specified in 
subsection (a) or (c) (other than the 2 years referred to in subsection (c)(4)) shall be 
suspended during any time that the taxpayer (or his spouse if the old residence and the new 
residence are each used by the taxpayer and his spouse as their principal residence) serves 
on extended active duty with the Armed Forces of the United States after the date of the 
sale of the old residence, except that any such period of time as so suspended shall not 
extend beyond the date 4 years after the date of the sale of the old residence. 
(2) Members stationed outside the United States or required to reside in government 
quarters. In the case of any taxpayer who, during any period of time the running of which 
is suspended by paragraph (1)— 
(A) is stationed outside of the United States, or 
(B) after returning from a tour of duty outside of the United States and pursuant to a 
determination by the Secretary7 of Defense that adequate off-base housing is not available 
at a remote base site, is required to reside in on-base Government quarters, 
any such period of time as so suspended shall not expire before the day which is 1 year after 
the last day described in subparagraph (A) or (B), as the case may be, except that any such 
period of time as so suspended shall not extend beyond the date which is 8 years after the 
date of the sale of the old residence. 
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(3) Extended active duty defined. For purposes of this subsection, the term 'extended active 
duty' means any period of active duty pursuant to a call or order to such duty for a period 
in excess of 90 days or for an indefinite period. 
(i) Special rule for condemnation. In the case of the seizure, requisition, or condemnation of a 
residence, or the sale or exchange of a residence under threat or imminence thereof, the provi-
sions of this section, in lieu of section 1033 (relating to involuntary- conversions), shall be ap-
plicable if the taxpayer so elects. If such election is made, such seizure, requisition, or 
condemnation shall be treated as the sale of the residence. Such election shall be made at such 
time and in such manner as the Secretary shall prescribe by regulations, 
(j) Statute of limitations. If the taxpayer during a taxable year sells at a gain property used by 
him as his principal residence, then— 
(1) the statutory period for the assessment of any deficiency attributable to any part of such 
gain shall not expire before the expiration of 3 years from the date the Secretary is notified 
by the taxpayer (in such manner as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe) of— 
(A) the taxpayer's cost of purchasing the new residence which the taxpayer claims results 
in nonrecognition of any part of such gain, 
(B) the taxpayer's intention not to purchase a new residence within the period specified 
in subsection (a), or 
(C) a failure to make such purchase within such period; and 
(2) such deficiency may be assessed before the expiration of such 3-year period notwithstand-
ing the provisions of any other law or rule of law which would otherwise prevent such as-
sessment. 
(k) Individual whose tax home is outside the United States. The running of any period of time 
specified in subsection (a) or (c) (other than the 2 years referred to in subsection (c)(4)) shall 
be suspended during any time that the taxpayer (or his spouse if the old residence and the new 
residence are each used by the taxpayer and his spouse as their principal residence) has a tax 
home (as defined in section 911(d)(3)) outside the United States after the date of the sale of 
the old residence; except that any such period of time as so suspended shall not extend beyond 
the date 4 years after the date of the sale of the old residence. 
(I) Cross reference. For one-time exclusion from gross income of gain from sale of principal 
residence by individual who has attained age 55, see section 121. 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
Amendments: 
In 1988, P.L. 100-647, Sec. 6002(a), added the sentence at the end of subsec. (g), effective 
for sales and exchanges of old residences (within the meaning of Code Sec. 1034 of the 1986 
Code) after 12/31/84, in tax. yrs. ending after 12/31/84. 
In 1986, P.L. 99-514, Sec. 1878(g), substituted 'before the day which is 1 year after the last 
day described' for 'before the last day described' in para, (h)(2), effective for sales of old 
residences (within the meaning of Code Sec. 1034) after 7/18/84. 
In 1984, P.L. 98-369, Sec. 1053(a), amended subsec. (h), effective for sales of old residences 
(within the meaning of Code Sec. 1034) after 7/18/84. 
Prior to amendment, subsec. (h) read as follows: 
"(h) Members of Armed Forces. 
"The running of any period of time specified in subsection (a) or (c) (other than the 2 
years referred to in subsection (c)(4)) shall be suspended during any time that the 
taxpayer (or his spouse if the old residence and the new residence are each used by the 
taxpayer and his spouse as their principal residence) serves on extended active duty with 
the Armed Forces of the United States after the date of the sale of the old residence 
except that any such period of time as so suspended shall not extend beyond the date 4 
years after the date of the sale of the old residence. For purposes of this subsection, the 
term 'extended active duty' means any period of active duty pursuant to a call or order 
to such duty for a period in excess of 90 days or for an indefinite period." 
In 1983, P.L. 97-448, Sec. 101(d), added the two sentences at the end of Sec. 122(c) of P.L. 
97-34, [the effective date for changes made by Sec. 122 of P.L. 97-34, see below]. 
In 1981, P.L. 97-34, Sec. 112(b)(4), substituted 'section 911(d)(3)' for 'section 9l3Q)(l)(BY 
in subsec. (k), effective for tax. yrs. begin, after 12/31/81. 
—P.L. 97-34, Sec. 122(a), substituted '2 years' for '18 months' each place it appeared in 
Code Sec. 1034 . . . Sec. 122(b)(1), substituted '2-year' for '18-month' in para, (c)(4) . . . 
Sec. 122(b)(2), repealed para, (c)(5), effective as provided in Sec. 122(c) of this Act [as 
amended by Sec. 101(d) of P.L. 97-448, see above] which reads as follows: 
"(c) Effective date. 
"The amendments made by this section shall apply to old residences (within the mean-
ing of section 1034 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954) sold or exchanged— 
"(1) after July 20, 1981, or 
"(2) on or before such date, if the rollover period under such section (determined without 
regard to the amendments made by this section) expires on or after such date. 
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